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THE LIMITS OF ADVOCACY
AMANDA FROST†
ABSTRACT
Party control over case presentation is regularly cited as a defining
characteristic of the American adversarial system. Accordingly,
American judges are strongly discouraged from engaging in so-called
“issue creation”—that is, raising legal claims and arguments that the
parties have overlooked or ignored—on the ground that doing so is
antithetical to an adversarial legal culture that values litigant
autonomy and prohibits agenda setting by judges. And yet, despite the
rhetoric, federal judges regularly inject new legal issues into ongoing
cases. Landmark Supreme Court decisions such as Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins and Mapp v. Ohio were decided on grounds never
raised by the parties, and nearly every term the Supreme Court adds
to the questions presented or assigns an amicus to argue an issue that
the parties have no interest in discussing. These practices operate
mostly under the academic radar, and thus there have been few
attempts to theorize deviations from the norm of party presentation.
This Article defends judicial issue creation as a necessary corollary
to the federal judiciary’s constitutional obligation to articulate the
meaning of contested questions of law. Federal courts do not simply
resolve disputes between parties; they are also responsible for making
pronouncements of law that are binding on all who come after. When
the parties fail to raise relevant legal claims and arguments—whether
by error or through conscious choice—judges must do so themselves
to avoid issuing inaccurate or incomplete statements of law. Although
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issue creation is often criticized as judicial overreaching, courts can
use this authority to limit the scope of their decisions, narrowing the
broad propositions of law relied on by the parties. Furthermore,
judicial power to raise issues sua sponte is compatible with adversary
theory as long as judges are careful to avoid slipping into the role of
advocate, and make sure to preserve an opportunity for a dialectical
exchange between the parties on new questions raised by the court.
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INTRODUCTION
Party control over case presentation is a central tenet of the
American adversarial legal system. An adversarial system is typically
defined as one in which the parties present the facts and legal
arguments to an impartial and passive decisionmaker, who then
decides cases on their terms. Indeed, party presentation is cited as the
major distinction between the adversarial system in the United States
and the inquisitorial systems of continental Europe, where judges
1
take the lead in the investigation and presentation of the case.
Accordingly, American judges are strongly discouraged from
engaging in so-called “issue creation”—that is, raising legal claims
and arguments that the parties have overlooked or ignored—on the
ground that doing so is antithetical to a legal culture that values
2
litigant autonomy and prohibits agenda setting by judges.
In light of the entrenched norm in favor of party presentation,
what should a court do when the parties to litigation, either
intentionally or by mistake, fail to raise key legal arguments? For
example, what if the parties ignore a statute that would resolve their
dispute, asking that the judge instead address a difficult constitutional
3
question that the judge would prefer to avoid? Or what if the parties
1. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991) (“What makes a system
adversarial rather than inquisitorial is . . . the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor
does) conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of
facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.”). See generally John H. Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) (comparing the roles of
lawyers and judges in the American and German legal systems).
2. See infra notes 42–43.
3. E.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457 (1960).
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agree on the meaning of a constitutional provision, differing only over
its application, and yet the judge thinks that both parties have
4
misinterpreted the constitutional text at issue? What should happen
if the parties fail to raise a legal argument or to use an interpretive
5
theory on which the judge would like to rely? All of these “what ifs”
describe actual cases in which courts were forced to choose between
violating the norm of party presentation, on the one hand, or issuing
an opinion containing inaccurate and misleading statements about the
meaning of the law, on the other.
Despite the rhetoric in favor of party presentation, judicial issue
creation is not uncommon. Indeed, some of the Supreme Court’s
landmark cases were decided on grounds that were never raised by
6
the parties. For example, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, neither
7
the petitioner nor the respondent took issue with Swift v. Tyson’s
holding that federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction could create
8
federal common law, and yet the Court overruled Swift and required
9
federal courts to abide by state common law rules. Although the
10
parties in Washington v. Davis agreed that the Equal Protection
11
Clause barred conduct having a disparate racial impact, the Court
rejected that view and held that the Constitution prohibits only
12
intentional discrimination. Most recently, in Dickerson v. United
13
14
15
States, both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court questioned
whether a federal statute governed the admission of confessions,
16
displacing the Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, even though
17
neither party relied on that statute. These cases are not outliers: the
U.S. Supreme Court frequently rewrites the questions presented,

4. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976).
5. E.g., Phillips/May Corp. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1264, 1269–70 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
6. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
8. Erie, 304 U.S. at 66 (argument for petitioner); id. at 68 (argument for respondent).
9. See id. at 80 (holding that by applying Swift v. Tyson, federal courts had assumed
powers constitutionally reserved to the states).
10. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
11. Id. at 238 n.8.
12. Id. at 239.
13. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), rev’g 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
14. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 682 (4th Cir. 1999).
15. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437, 441 n.7 (noting that because the parties had not argued
in favor of the statute’s constitutionality, the Court had invited amicus curiae to do so).
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437, 441 n.7; Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 682.
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adds new questions, and even assigns amici to argue positions that no
18
party defends. Such practices coexist uneasily within an adversarial
tradition that supposedly gives the parties, and not the judge, control
over case presentation.
Neither courts nor legal commentators have acknowledged the
many institutionalized judicial practices that seem to undermine the
norm against issue creation. To the contrary, judicial opinions and the
academic literature confidently promote party presentation, and are
19
critical of judges who raise issues sua sponte. The lack of a
conceptual framework to support judicial issue creation discourages
some judges from raising issues sua sponte even when there are
compelling reasons to do so, and leaves those judges who do
supplement the parties’ legal arguments open to the charge that they
have transgressed the bounds of judicial power to further their
20
personal ideological agenda. As a purely practical matter, then, the
tension between the rhetoric in favor of party presentation and the
actual practice is one that deserves further discussion for the benefit
of judges struggling to reconcile their conflicting obligations in
specific cases.
From a jurisprudential perspective, the issue goes to the core of
21
what judges, particularly federal judges, are asked to do. Federal
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court
Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 292 (2000) (“[T]he courts
exceeded the appropriate judicial role in raising a major constitutional issue not presented by
the parties . . . .”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
388 (1978) (asserting that the system works best when the decisionmaker “rests his decision
wholly on the proofs and argument actually presented to him by the parties”); infra note 42 and
accompanying text.
An exception is Neal Devins’s article defending the Fourth Circuit’s sua sponte
questioning of the continuing validity of Miranda in its decision in Dickerson v. United States.
Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored the Separation of Powers by
Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 253 (2000). Professor Devins argues
convincingly in support of the Fourth Circuit, but does not purport to defend sua sponte
decisionmaking in circumstances outside of the unique situation presented by Dickerson. See id.
at 277 (noting that “Dickerson is a truly unusual case” and commenting that he “do[es] not
mean to suggest that courts ought to search out ways to decide cases in which the executive is
unwilling to defend the constitutionality of an act of Congress”).
20. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 302 (“[I]n Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit
invoked § 3501 over the objections of the parties precisely because it wanted to reach a
particular result: upholding its constitutionality.”).
21. Some of this Article’s arguments regarding judicial power to raise new issues of law
would apply to state as well as federal judges. Much of this Article focuses on the role of the
federal courts in the constitutional structure, however, and thus the power of state courts may
differ depending on their place in state government.
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judges serve a dual role: they must resolve the concrete disputes
before them, and yet under the constitutional structure and in the
common law tradition they are also expected to make accurate
statements about the meaning of law that govern beyond the
22
parameters of the parties and their dispute. Usually, the disputeresolution and law-pronouncement functions complement one
another because judges are more likely to reach the “right” legal
answer when two parties, each with a stake in the matter, compete to
present the most persuasive case to the court. But when the parties
fail to fulfill their role in the adversary system—whether by error or
through conscious choice—judges must choose between dispute
resolution and law pronouncement. They may either decide the
dispute on the parties’ chosen terms, as the adversary model would
seem to require, or introduce new grounds for a decision on their own
initiative, producing a judicially driven, but more accurate, statement
of law. This tension between the two central functions of the federal
judge suggests that it is worth taking a closer look at the norm against
judicial issue creation.
This Article contends that there are good reasons to promote
judicial issue creation in certain categories of cases. Issue creation is
an essential means of protecting the judiciary’s role in the
constitutional structure. As the third branch of government, federal
judges are assigned the task of settling the meaning of disputed
questions of law, not just for the parties, but for all who must comply
with it. Furthermore, they must do so free from outside influence. As
a result, courts have the power to look beyond the parties’ arguments

22. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV.
1273, 1275 (1995) (“Almost everyone today would agree that adjudication is about articulating
public norms as well as settling private disputes . . . .”); Robert M. Cover, The Uses of
Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 643
(1981) (“Adjudication in the common law mold entails two simultaneously performed functions:
dispute resolution and norm articulation.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation,
Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410,
412 (1978) (“One function of adjudication is the settlement of past disputes. Frequently the
adjudicator assumes a second function of making rules to govern future conduct.”); Owen M.
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30
(1979) (stating that “dispute resolution may be one consequence of the judicial decision” but the
“function of the judge” is to “give the proper meaning to our public values”); Chad M.
Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO.
L.J. 121, 137–38 & n.51 (2005) (discussing the courts’ dual function of dispute resolution and law
pronouncement, and stating that “there is general agreement that both functions play some role
in adjudication”).
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when failing to do so would lead to an inaccurate or incomplete
description of the law.
Furthermore, because federal judges operate within a common
law system in which the precedent in one case establishes the law for
all who follow, it is particularly important that they make accurate
statements about the meaning of law. Lower federal courts are bound
by hierarchical precedent, and stare decisis instructs that judges
should not reject their own court’s past precedent absent special
23
circumstances. In a legal system in which appellate opinions not only
establish the meaning of law, but do so through precedent that binds
future litigants, courts cannot cede to the parties control over legal
24
analysis. In truth, as will be discussed in Part I, judges in the United
States often reach beyond the four corners of the parties’ briefing
when they think that the parties have not accurately described the
law. This Article defends that choice.
To be sure, the parties are essential to the exercise of federal
judicial power; without them, there would be no “[c]ase[]” or
25
“[c]ontrovers[y]” on which a federal court could act. The parties are
also in the best position to find and make all the arguments in their
favor, and usually (though not always) can be relied upon to do so.
Issue creation should not be an everyday occurrence, because it can
lead to delay, disrupt settled expectations, and undermine litigant
26
autonomy. Yet the parties cannot be allowed to completely control
the judiciary’s statements of law, or even the interpretive process, lest
they undermine the federal courts’ role to independently ascertain
the meaning of legal texts for the benefit of all.
Although judicial issue creation itself has not received much
attention, striking the right balance between dispute resolution and
law pronouncement has long been the subject of debate among legal
academics. Lon Fuller is most closely associated with the traditionally
adversarial “dispute resolution” model of adjudication, in which
private disputes are resolved by a neutral and passive

23. See infra Part II.D.
24. In common law jurisdictions, “precedents were not merely evidence of the law but the
law itself.” GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL
CONTEXT 35 (2005). In civil law countries, “cases are merely evidence of the law.” Id. at 36.
25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
26. See infra Part IV for further discussion of the criteria that should govern issue creation.
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27

decisionmaker. In contrast, scholars such as Owen Fiss and Abram
Chayes described a “public values” model that they claimed better
suits modern, public law litigation in which judges articulate legal
28
standards that affect large numbers of stakeholders. As these
scholars themselves recognized, however, the complex, multipurpose
act of adjudication need not be forced into one of two polarized
29
camps. Any viable model of adjudication has to make room for both
dispute resolution and law pronouncement, without sacrificing either
function for the sake of the other. Rather than deepening the
dichotomy, this Article attempts to bring these two functions of
adjudication closer together by describing how federal courts can
reconcile their duty to decide cases through the adversarial system
with their competing constitutional and common law obligations to
establish legal standards for the nation.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I.A describes the norm
against judicial issue creation and discusses the rationales that
underlie it. Part I.B then makes the descriptive claim that, in practice,
the norm is weaker than the rhetoric promoting it would suggest. Part
II seeks to bridge the gap between rhetoric and practice by laying out
a defense of judicial issue creation grounded upon the federal
judiciary’s constitutional obligation to declare the meaning of federal
law free from outside influence. Part III discusses how courts can
balance dispute resolution with law pronouncement—the subject of
longstanding debate among proceduralists—and explores ways in
which the adversarial system can account for the latter task. Finally,
Part IV translates theory into practice by describing the criteria that

27. See Fuller, supra note 19, at 364 (characterizing adjudication as a process that gives the
private parties whose interests are at stake the opportunity to present arguments in their favor
to a neutral arbiter).
28. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1282–84 (1976) (contrasting the “traditional” model of adjudication as “a vehicle for
settling disputes between private parties about private rights” with a “public law” model where
“the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies”); Owen M. Fiss,
Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (stating that the “job” of a judge
“is not to maximize the ends of private parties . . . but to explicate and give force to the values
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes”); Fiss, supra note 22, at 30
(arguing that “dispute resolution may be one consequence of” adjudication, but the “function of
the judge . . . is not to resolve disputes, but to give the proper meaning to our public values”);
Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 34–35
(2003) (discussing the differences between Fuller’s and Chayes’s models of litigation).
29. Cf. Bone, supra note 22, at 1275 (asserting that Lon Fuller’s theory of adjudication has
been distorted by scholars who wrongly perceive of Fuller as promoting a “dispute resolution
model” that stands in polar opposition to Chayes and Fiss’s “public law model”).
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judges may consider when deciding whether to raise new legal issues
or arguments that have gone unmentioned by the parties, and
suggests that courts carefully weigh the costs to the parties of raising
new issues against the benefits of preserving the judiciary’s lawpronouncement function.
The arguments in favor of judicial issue creation are not trump
cards that always outweigh the strong rationales against it.
Nonetheless, good arguments for the practice do exist. The purpose
of this Article is to demonstrate that judicial issue creation is not a
deviant act of judicial overreaching, and to provide a defense for a
practice that operates mostly under the academic radar and without
explanation or support. By articulating the rationales supporting
judicial issue creation—rationales that are currently absent from most
judicial opinions and academic commentary—I hope this Article will
assist judges in determining when raising new issues is a legitimate
exercise of judicial power, and defend judges that do so from charges
of overstepping.
I. THE PARTY PRESENTATION NORM
The rhetoric in favor of party presentation is not always
consistent with actual judicial practice. Part I.A defines the norm
against judicial issue creation and describes how party presentation is
viewed as an essential aspect of the adversarial system. Part I.B points
out occasions on which courts deviate from the norm, usually without
providing an explanation for doing so, and argues that these
exceptions suggest that issue creation is sometimes justified.
A. The Norm against Judicial Issue Creation
1. Defining the Norm. Before discussing the rationale underlying
the norm against judicial issue creation, a clarification of terms is
needed. This Article repeatedly refers to the norm in favor of “party
presentation” and against “judicial issue creation,” which is also
sometimes described as the prohibition against “sua sponte
decisionmaking.” These terms are used by political scientists, legal
scholars, and jurists as shorthand for the conventional view that the
parties to litigation, and not the judge, are responsible for raising the
30
legal questions that will ultimately be resolved by the court. As the
30. See, e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2564 (2008) (describing the
“principle of party presentation,” under which “the parties . . . frame the issues for decision”
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U.S. Supreme Court explained in its recent decision in Greenlaw v.
31
United States:
In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first
instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party
presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for
decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters
32
the parties present.

Not all judicial involvement in case presentation, however, would
violate the norm as typically described. Indeed, if the party
presentation rule were taken literally, courts would violate it simply
by relying on overlooked legal sources, such as judicial precedent that
the parties did not cite. But the norm does not extend to such
minimally proactive judicial conduct, which is viewed as well within
33
judicial power, and thus is not the focus of this Article.
In contrast, the norm against issue creation clearly discourages
judges from raising new legal claims missed by the parties. For
example, if the parties differ over the meaning of a particular
statutory provision, but neither party cites or relies upon a different
statute that appears to resolve their dispute, judges will generally
claim that they lack the authority to rely on the uncited statute to
34
decide the case. Likewise, if the parties fail to raise a constitutional
challenge to a statute, the norm generally bars courts from doing so

and the courts take on “the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present”); Sarah M.R.
Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 251 (2004) (discussing uncertainty
about the extent to which a court “may choose to consider . . . an issue [not raised by the
parties] sua sponte”); Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Timothy Johnson, The Claim of Issue
Creation on the U.S. Supreme Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 845, 845 (1996) (describing the
“practice disfavoring the creation of issues not raised in the record before the Court” as a
“norm”); Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should Courts Consider 18 USC § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1049 (1998) (“In practice, it is unusual for courts to consider issues sua
sponte . . . .”).
31. Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559 (2008).
32. Id. at 2564.
33. See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 511–12 (1994) (holding that an appellate
court should take notice of relevant legal precedent overlooked by the parties). It is worth
noting that the unquestioned judicial power to sua sponte take notice of relevant precedent
suggests that judges have an obligation to pronounce upon an objective version of the law, and
not simply the parties’ subjective view of it—an observation that supports giving judges broader
power to raise overlooked legal claims and arguments.
34. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 497 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (refusing to address sua sponte a legal argument that the parties had failed to raise).
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35

sua sponte. And if neither party questions whether a regulation is
authorized by a federal statute, the courts will interpret and apply the
36
regulation without addressing that question. Although judges have
at times reached these issues despite the norm, as will be described in
detail in Part I.B, the general understanding is that they should not.
A closer question is whether the norm prohibits judicial creation
of a new legal theory to support a party’s existing claim. For example,
if a party asserts that a statute’s plain language is in its favor, but fails
to cite or make any arguments regarding legislative history, can a
court sua sponte take notice of the legislative history and craft an
argument about statutory meaning on that basis, or has the party
37
forfeited any such argument by failing to discuss it? This type of
issue creation falls in a gray area in which some judges think they are
free to raise additional arguments that support a party’s claims, while
38
others contend courts should not go so far. Thus, although the norm
does not clearly apply here, it nonetheless maintains some residual
influence over courts trained to assume that parties control case
presentation. Confusion over the judicial role in borderline cases
further underscores the need to develop a rationale to govern judicial
discretion to raise issues and arguments overlooked by the parties.
2. Rationales for the Norm. Party control over case presentation
is described as an essential aspect of the American adversarial

35. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I
also note that whether the Act constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause is not before the Court. The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is
outside the question presented; and the lower courts did not address it.”); Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486–87 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting, but declining to
address, a potential constitutional problem with a federal statute because the parties did not
raise the issue).
36. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001) (“We do not inquire here
whether the DOJ regulation was authorized by § 602 . . . . The petition for writ of certiorari
raised, and we agreed to review, only the question . . . whether there is a private cause of action
to enforce the regulation.”).
37. See, e.g., Phillips/May Corp. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1264, 1270 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(noting that neither party cited legislative history that the court found dispositive of a legal
question in the case).
38. Compare Bombardier, 380 F.3d at 497 (refusing to address sua sponte a legal argument
that the parties had failed to raise), and Warner v. Aetna Health Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154
n.7 (W.D. Okla. 2004) (refusing to address a legal argument not raised by the parties), with
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly
before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties,
but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of
governing law.”).
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39

system. The federal reporter is replete with cases asserting that
courts have “no right to consider issues not raised by a party”—a
40
position routinely accepted by every circuit court in the country. As
Justice Scalia declared in a concurrence: “The rule that points not
argued will not be considered is more than just a prudential rule of
convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases,
distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial
41
one.”
Legal scholars agree that the norm against judicial issue creation
is firmly entrenched in adversarial theory. As Judith Resnik has
observed, “our tradition is considered more adversarial than most,
and its basic principle is that the parties, not the judge, have the major
42
responsibility for and control over the definition of the dispute.”

39. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380 n.23 (1982)
(“Some proceduralists identify ‘party-presentation’ and ‘party-prosecution’ as the two
fundamental elements of adversarialism.”); supra note 1.
40. See, e.g., Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224, 1229 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining to
decide the case on grounds not raised by the parties); e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d
594, 599 (7th Cir. 2007) (declining to raise an affirmative defense sua sponte); Kropelnicki v.
Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 130 n.7 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that statutes of limitations ordinarily should
not be raised sua sponte); Curry v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 67 F.3d 517, 522 n.8 (4th Cir.
1995) (“The normal rule of course is that failure to raise an issue for review in the prescribed
manner constitutes a waiver.”); Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“Generally, where the parties have not raised a defense, the court should not address the
defense sua sponte.”); Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 812 (3d Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (“We do not generally consider issues not raised by the parties . . . .”); Izquierdo Prieto v.
Mercado Rosa, 894 F.2d 467, 471 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Ordinarily, we would decline to raise a
defense sua sponte that a party had failed to raise on his own behalf.”); Carducci v. Regan, 714
F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts
do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal
questions presented and argued by the parties before them.”).
41. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
42. Resnik, supra note 39, at 382 (footnote omitted); see also Greenlaw v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 2559, 2564 (2008) (“In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the
first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on
the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of
matters the parties present.”); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991) (“What makes
a system adversarial . . . is . . . the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does)
conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and
arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.”); Carducci, 714 F.2d at 177 (“The premise of
our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry
and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties
before them.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 268 (5th ed. 2007) (“In
American courts that are committed to the adversary system, generally judges are supposed to
rule only on motions brought by the parties.”); Epstein et al., supra note 30, at 845 (describing
the “practice disfavoring the creation of issues not raised in the record before the Court” as a
“norm”); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND.
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Stephan Landsman, a scholar of the adversarial system, declared that
“reliance on party presentation of evidence” is one of the “key
43
elements” of adversarialism. Likewise, in her critique of adversarial
process, Ellen Sward explained that the “adversary system is
characterized by party control of the investigation and presentation of
evidence and argument, and by a passive decisionmaker who merely
listens to both sides and renders a decision based on what she has
44
heard.”
The norm against judicial issue creation is grounded in American
cultural conceptions regarding the proper role of the judiciary in a
constitutional democracy. American legal culture promotes litigant
autonomy over control by government actors, particularly when those
actors are unelected, and thus unaccountable, members of the federal
45
judicial branch. The litigants’ control of case presentation is thought
to promote dignitary and participation values by “affirm[ing] human
individuality” and showing “respect for the opinions of each party,”
46
producing an outcome more satisfying to winners and losers alike.
Professor Landsman explained: “Adversary theory holds that if a
party is intimately involved in the adjudicatory process and feels that
he has been given a fair opportunity to present his case, he is likely to
47
accept the results whether favorable or not.”
In contrast, a judge-dominated inquisitorial system is viewed as
uniquely un-American in its emphasis on management of litigation by
government bureaucrats, and the concomitant disempowerment of
the private litigant. As David Sklansky recently observed,

L.J. 301, 302 (1989) (“The adversary system is characterized by party control of the investigation
and presentation of evidence and argument, and by a passive decisionmaker who merely listens
to both sides and renders a decision based on what she has heard.”).
43. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 2 (1988); see also id. (“The adversary system relies on a neutral
and passive decision maker to adjudicate disputes after they have been aired by the adversaries
in a contested proceeding.”).
44. Sward, supra note 42, at 302; see also Devins, supra note 19, at 252 (“[A] central tenet
of our adversarial system is that (save for jurisdictional issues) the parties to a case—not the
judges deciding the case—raise the legal arguments.”).
45. See, e.g., STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA:
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 22–25 (2006); Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market
Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate
Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2130 (2000) (identifying the freedom of civil litigants to
“make their way through the adversarial processes . . . on their own” as a premise “deeply
embedded within United States culture”).
46. LANDSMAN, supra note 43, at 33–39.
47. Id. at 34.
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inquisitorialism is an epithet among American judges, practitioners,
and scholars, and consequently the American legal system has been
constructed to avoid even the whiff of its judge-dominated
48
procedures.
The norm against issue creation can even be said to have quasiconstitutional roots. It has at least a passing relationship to Article
III’s case or controversy requirement, which limits courts to deciding
disputes between parties with actual injuries that were caused by the
legal wrong of which they complain and which are remediable by a
court. To be sure, courts are not constitutionally barred from raising
49
new issues. Nonetheless, the principle that the parties, and not the
judge, should frame cases is grounded upon the same values as those
underlying the doctrine of standing. Both promote separation of
powers by preventing courts from setting their own agendas, as is the
50
prerogative of the legislature. And both ensure that courts decide
only those issues that are briefed and argued by stakeholders with an
incentive to adequately represent their interests to the court, which in
51
turn will produce better judicial decisions.
In addition, the party presentation norm has a relationship to
some of the core elements of due process. At a minimum, due process
requires that the state provide notice and an opportunity to be heard
by an impartial decisionmaker before it can take away life, liberty, or
52
property. Due process focuses on giving the individual an
opportunity to present his case, rather than on ensuring that a case is
accurately and fully argued by some third party who claims to have
53
the individual’s interest in mind. Furthermore, because the
decisionmaker must remain impartial, he cannot serve as an advocate
48. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1638 (2009)
(“[T]he vast majority of American scholars, like the vast majority of American judges, are apt to
agree with the Supreme Court that the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, far from meriting
emulation, should be studiously avoided — indeed, that avoiding inquisitorial justice is what our
own system is all about.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. See infra Part I.B.
50. LANDSMAN, supra note 43, at 34 (“When litigants direct the proceedings, there is little
opportunity for the judge to pursue her own agenda or to act on her biases.”).
51. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–61 (1992); see also Abram
Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term—Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 24 (1982) (stating that standing doctrine “ensur[es] vigorous
adversary presentation”).
52. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
53. Cf. LANDSMAN, supra note 43, at 35 (“Party control . . . . affirms human individuality. It
mandates respect for the opinions of each party rather than those of his attorney, of the court,
or of society at large.”).
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for the interests of either party. The judge’s “detachment” is claimed
54
to “preserve[] the appearance of fairness as well as fairness itself.”
These characteristics of due process are promoted by the adversarial
55
system’s reliance on the parties to take the lead in case presentation.
Finally, party presentation serves important practical purposes. It
promotes judicial economy, efficient resolution of disputes, and
finality. Requiring that the parties and not the court frame legal issues
preserves precious judicial resources; courts simply do not have the
56
time or personnel to act as auxiliary counsel. Cases are most
efficiently resolved when the parties lay out all of their arguments at
the outset, giving each side a chance to fully brief and argue the issues
relevant to their dispute. Moreover, if courts raise new issues at the
eleventh hour, they risk needlessly extending costly and disruptive
57
litigation.
For all these reasons, the norm against judicial issue creation
appears embedded in the American legal system. Yet the significant
number of exceptions to the norm discussed below demonstrates that
it is less foundational than the rhetoric would suggest.
B. Exceptions to the Norm
Courts have developed a number of doctrinal exceptions to the
party presentation rule, some of which are so broadly worded as to
58
essentially give courts carte blanche to raise new issues at any time.
Such exceptions include: the ability of courts to examine jurisdictional
questions sua sponte, the justification of issue creation for exceptional
54. Id. at 34 (“Because the judge seldom takes the lead in conducting the proceedings, she
is unlikely to appear to be partisan or to become embroiled in the contest. Her detachment
preserves the appearance of fairness as well as fairness itself.”).
55. Id. at 37 (noting that due process requires judicial neutrality and an opportunity to
present evidence).
56. See id. at 35 (“According to adversary theory, when each actor performs only a single
function the dispute before the court will be resolved in the fairest and most efficient way.”).
57. E.g., United States v. Wiseman, 297 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir. 2002) (declining to raise a
new issue sua sponte because it would delay resolution of the litigation).
58. See THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION
GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 124 (1978) (“[One] court rule, applied to issues not
raised at trial as well as on appeal, is that issues not raised will be ignored unless doing so would
result in an injustice. . . . [T]his is a very uncertain standard, and it leaves the judges a good deal
of discretion. . . . Other courts often use ‘justice’ or other elusive standards, such as ‘plain error’
or ‘fundamental error,’ in determining when to decide an issue not raised.”); see also Adam A.
Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate
Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 248 (2002) (noting that despite the rhetoric against sua sponte
decisionmaking by courts, “raising issues sua sponte is not an uncommon practice”).
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issues on the merits, procedural rules and practices allowing for
modification of the questions presented, and the use of amicus curiae.
These exceptions coexist uneasily with the party presentation rule,
with no judicial acknowledgement that they are seemingly at odds
with a primary characteristic of the adversary system.
1. Jurisdiction.
The best-known exception to the party
presentation rule permits courts to question their capacity or
suitability to hear a case or a specific issue. For example, courts will
investigate their subject matter jurisdiction, the litigant’s standing to
sue, and whether federalism or comity concerns counsel judicial
restraint, even if the parties fail to raise these issues. Indeed, federal
judges are obligated to establish that a case falls within one of the
subject matter headings of Article III to ensure that they do not
impinge on the role of the other two branches of the federal
59
government or undermine state courts. Likewise, Article III limits
federal judicial power to “Cases” or “Controversies,” and thus federal
courts must find that the plaintiff has standing—that is, a concrete
injury, caused by the challenged conduct, which a court can remedy—
60
before presiding over that plaintiff’s case. A court’s responsibility to
satisfy itself of its jurisdiction to proceed is rationalized as necessary
to maintain the judiciary’s limited role in the constitutional
61
structure.
Although not constitutionally compelled to do so, courts will
raise preclusion, abstention, and sovereign immunity in a similar spirit
62
of judicial restraint. Courts justify raising questions of issue and
claim preclusion sua sponte as necessary to protect the resources and
63
integrity of the federal judiciary. Abstention and sovereign
immunity are given special attention out of concern for state
sovereignty, which courts argue must be protected from litigants who
64
might not have state interests in mind.
59. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 258 (3d ed. 1999).
60. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–61 (1992).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Cincinnati Indem. Co. v. A&K Constr. Co, 542 F.3d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 2008)
(raising abstention sua sponte); Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d
461, 474 (6th Cir. 2006) (raising sovereign immunity sua sponte); Scherer v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc’y, 347 F.3d 394, 398 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that “a court is free to raise [res
judicata] sua sponte”).
63. See, e.g., Salahuddin v. Jones, 992 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir.1993).
64. See, e.g., Cincinnati Indem. Co., 542 F.3d at 624–25 (raising abstention sua sponte);
Nair, 443 F.3d at 474 (raising sovereign immunity sua sponte).
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The rationales for these exceptions have potentially broad
application. The judiciary’s interest in protecting the constitutionally
demarcated limits on its authority, preserving judicial resources, and
protecting interests beyond those of the parties would justify issue
creation in a wide range of situations, and thus could extend beyond
questions of prudential and constitutional limits on federal
jurisdiction.
2. Merits. The second and more amorphous category of
exceptions includes merits issues that are in some way exceptional.
Judges justify raising issues sua sponte to avoid plain error, or
because it is in the public interest to do so, or to prevent a miscarriage
65
of justice. This second category of exceptions is not much of a
category at all, because judges have not articulated a clear set of
conditions that lead them to deviate from their typical practice of
letting the parties frame the dispute. A leading treatise on Supreme
Court practice acknowledged that the Court’s practice is ad hoc:
Analysis of other cases in which the Court considered a question not
presented in a petition suggests that the exception from the normal
rule is not circumscribed by any particular formula, and that it
reflects the Court’s discretionary authority to dispose of cases in
66
what it determines to be the most sensible and reasonable way.
67

Federal circuit courts similarly act with little rhyme or reason. The
absence of principled guidelines governing judicial issue creation has

65. See, e.g., Curry v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 67 F.3d 517, 522 n.8 (4th Cir. 1995)
(“The normal rule of course is that the failure to raise an issue for review in the prescribed
manner constitutes a waiver. But the rule is not an absolute one and review may proceed (even
completely sua sponte) when the equities require.” (citation omitted)); Lambert v. Genesee
Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We recognize that th[e] issue was not presented to this
court . . . . However, we have discretion to consider and decide sua sponte a dispositive issue of
law . . . .”); Counts v. Kissack Water & Oil Serv., Inc., 986 F.2d 1322, 1325–26 (10th Cir. 1993)
(“Although it is rarely done, an appellate court may, sua sponte, raise a dispositive issue of law
when the proper resolution is beyond doubt and the failure to address the issue would result in a
miscarriage of justice.”).
66. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 346 (7th ed. 1993).
67. See United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 651 (7th Cir. 2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting),
judgment vacated, 531 U.S. 1135 (2001) (“There is . . . no rigid and undeviating judicially
declared practice under which courts of review invariably and under all circumstances decline to
consider all questions which have not previously been specifically urged. . . . Exceptional cases
or particular circumstances may prompt a reviewing court, where injustice might otherwise
result or where public policy requires, to consider questions neither pressed nor passed upon
below.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Nuelsen v. Sorensen, 293 F.2d 454, 462 (9th Cir.
1961))).
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led some to accuse judges of raising new issues when doing so accords
68
with their personal preferences.
3. Questions Presented. In addition to judges’ willingness to raise
new legal claims and arguments on their own motion, federal courts
have also adopted a number of procedural rules and practices at odds
with the party presentation rule. For example, the Supreme Court has
long assumed the power to amend or add to the questions presented
by the parties for resolution. Frequently, the Court rewrites those
questions to clarify, narrow, or simplify the issues framed by the
parties. On occasion, the Court has even made substantive changes to
the issues the parties ask it to review, or has added entirely new
69
questions.
The Supreme Court has never reconciled its habit of adding to
the questions raised by the parties with the norm of party
presentation. Moreover, the practice is also at odds with Supreme
Court Rule 14(1)(a), which provides: “Only the questions set out in
the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the
Court.” Although the Court acknowledges that “we ordinarily do not
consider questions outside those presented in the petition for
certiorari,” it has gone on to describe that practice as “prudential,”
and thus one that can be “disregard[ed]” in “exceptional cases,” when
70
“reasons of urgency or of economy” justify doing so. In short, the

68. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 302 (“[I]n Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit
invoked § 3501 over the objections of the parties precisely because it wanted to reach a
particular result: upholding its constitutionality.”); Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate
Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1253, 1256–58, 1260 (2002) (“The absence of a consistent principle [for raising issues sua sponte]
leaves courts open to the accusation that ignoring the adversary process is a political action,
where a court reaches out to legislate instead of following judicial norms.”).
69. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992) (noting that the Court has
“on occasion rephrased the question presented by a petitioner or requested the parties to
address an important question of law not raised in the petition for certiorari”); Payne v.
Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1080, 1080 (1991) (granting the certiorari petition and “request[ing]” that
the parties “brief and argue whether Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), should be overruled”); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 485 U.S. 617, 617 (1988) (ordering the parties to address whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981
affords a remedy against private employers); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 408 U.S. 921, 921
(1972) (ordering the parties to brief an additional question); Neely v. Strubs Constr. Co., 382
U.S. 914, 914 (1965) (granting the certiorari petition and asking the parties to address whether
the appellate court’s power pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 and the Court’s own
precedent to issue a judgment notwithstanding the verdict justified the ruling below).
70. Yee, 503 U.S. at 535 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481 n.15 (1976)). In
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the
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Court has retained seemingly standardless discretion to violate the
norm of party presentation whenever it wishes to do so.
4. Amicus Curiae. The widespread participation of amicus curiae
at all stages of litigation is also in tension with the party presentation
71
principle. Although many amicus briefs simply underscore the
petitioners’ and respondents’ arguments, some stake out new
territory, and no rule forbids them from doing so. To the contrary, the
rules of procedure governing amicus filings in the U.S. Supreme
Court state that amicus briefs should discuss aspects of the case given
short shrift or entirely overlooked by the parties, and discourage
72
amicus briefs that simply reiterate the litigants’ arguments.
Studies have shown that amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court
are effective, in that they increase the chances of the Court granting
73
certiorari and improve the likelihood of success on the merits.
Furthermore, and of relevance to this Article, their value comes not
just from the show of support but from the new arguments and
information they provide to the Court in favor of one party or the
other. Political scientist Paul Collins devised a study to determine
whether the value of amicus briefs came from the number of people
supporting a position, or whether judges gained additional legal and
factual material from these briefs that assisted them in reaching a

Supreme Court stated that the rule “does not limit our power to decide important questions not
raised by the parties,” and went on to describe “well-recognized exceptions” to the rule. Id. at
320 n.6.
71. Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine
Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 671 (2008) (reporting
that amicus participation in the Supreme Court increased 800 percent during the last half of the
twentieth century); John Harrington, Note, Amici Curiae in the Federal Courts of Appeals: How
Friendly Are They?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 667, 680 (2005) (reporting that amicus
participation in the courts of appeals increased 14.6 percent from 1992 through 2002).
72. See SUP. CT. R. 37.1; see also Simard, supra note 71, at 691 (noting that “amici are
criticized if they merely duplicate the information presented by the parties”). In the words of
Supreme Court Rule 37.1: “An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court
relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help
to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its
filing is not favored.” SUP. CT. R. 37.1.
73. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1122 (1988) (“[T]he addition of just one
amicus curiae brief in support of certiorari increases the likelihood of plenary review by 40%–
50%.”); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 830 (2000).
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decision, and concluded that they were effective for both reasons.
Another recent article summarizing a nationwide survey of federal
judges concluded that “judges at all three levels of the federal bench
find amici curiae helpful in offering new legal arguments that are
absent from the parties’ briefs,” though the author was careful to note
that amici “may not stray too far from the agenda as set by the
75
parties.”
So it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has based some of
its most important holdings on arguments raised only in amicus briefs.
76
In Teague v. Lane, the Court addressed the retroactivity of the
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim on habeas review, even though
77
that issue was raised only in an amicus brief. Likewise, the parties in
78
Mapp v. Ohio did not argue that the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule should apply to the states, and yet the Court
adopted that argument after noting that it had been raised in an
79
80
amicus brief. More recently, in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck
down an amendment to the Colorado state constitution that
prohibited legal protections for gay people, relying on the arguments
81
in an amicus brief by Professor Laurence Tribe.
Most remarkable in light of the party presentation norm, the
Supreme Court occasionally appoints amicus curiae to argue a
position that no party to the case supports, even when those issues are
not jurisdictional. For example, in Bob Jones University v. United
82
States, the Supreme Court appointed William Coleman as amicus
curiae to argue that institutions that discriminate on the basis of race
are not entitled to tax-exempt status after the United States
83
84
abandoned that position. More recently, in Irizarry v. United States,

74. Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807 passim (2004).
75. Simard, supra note 71, at 690–92.
76. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
77. Id. at 300.
78. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
79. Id. at 646 n.3.
80. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
81. Kenji Yoshino, Tribe, 42 TULSA L. REV. 961, 966 (2007).
82. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
83. Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc. v. United States, 456 U.S. 922, 922 (1982) (“William T.
Coleman, Jr., Esquire, of Washington, D.C., a member of the Bar of this Court, is invited to
brief and argue [this case and Bob Jones University], as amicus curiae in support of the
judgments below.”).
84. Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198 (2008).
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the Court assigned Professor Peter Rutledge to defend the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(h) does not require that a trial court give notice in advance of
imposing a criminal sentence that departs from the sentencing
guidelines after both the United States and the defendant agreed that
85
such notice must be provided.
Relying on arguments made by amici is a clear transgression of
the norm of party presentation, but it cannot be described as
straightforward judicial issue creation. Judges who turn to amici are
not setting their own agenda, as judges who raise issues sua sponte
can be accused of doing. Furthermore, the parties may respond to
arguments by amici, and thus provide the judge with an adversarial
exchange on the new issues raised. Even though participation by
amici is not equivalent to judicial issue creation, the prevalence of
amicus participation nonetheless emphasizes the shaky foundation of
the party presentation norm.
C. Issue Creation in Practice
Below are descriptions of a few significant cases in which the
Supreme Court has raised an issue that went unmentioned by the
parties. Part II will return to these examples to illustrate the
rationales supporting judicial issue creation.
1. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins has
long been considered one of the most important cases in American
legal history for its holding that federal courts lack the power to
86
create federal common law—a question that the parties never raised.
Erie Railroad was sued by Tompkins, a pedestrian injured by a
passing train while walking near Erie’s railroad tracks in
Pennsylvania. The railroad’s liability turned on whether Tompkins
was to be treated as a licensee, in which case the railroad would be
liable for its negligence, or whether he was a trespasser to whom the
railroad could be liable only if its conduct amounted to “wanton or
willful” negligence. Tompkins argued that under the precedent of
Swift v. Tyson, the federal court must develop its own common law
85. Id. at 2202.
86. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
378 (6th ed. 2002) (“It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie decision.” (footnote
omitted)); Justice Hugo Black, Address at the Sixty-Second Annual Meeting of the Missouri
Bar Association (Sept. 25, 1942), in 13 MO. B.J. 173, 174 (1942) (declaring Erie “one of the most
important cases at law in American legal history”).
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rule regarding the appropriate standard of care, and urged the Court
to consider Tompkins a licensee. The railroad did not question the
holding in Swift v. Tyson, and thus did not contest the federal courts’
power to create federal general common law. Instead, the railroad
made the narrower claim that Swift applied only when the relevant
state court had yet to speak clearly on the matter. Because
Pennsylvania state courts had held that a railroad owed no duty of
care to a pedestrian using a path near the railroad, the railroad
claimed that the federal court must adopt this standard. Even though
neither party questioned the validity of Swift, the Court overturned
that precedent and ruled that federal courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction had no power to create “federal general common law”
87
and must instead apply the common law rules of the relevant state.
2. Washington v. Davis. In Washington v. Davis, a group of
unsuccessful African-American applicants for positions on the police
force in Washington, D.C., sued the city, claiming that a written
personnel test administered as part of the application process
disproportionately excluded blacks but had no relationship to job
performance, and therefore violated the Constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause. The plaintiffs did not claim that they were victims
of intentional discrimination, but argued instead that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits government conduct that has a disparate
impact based on race. The defendant agreed that the plaintiffs could
prevail on their constitutional claim without demonstrating that the
defendant was motivated by discriminatory animus, but argued that
the personnel test was related to job performance and thus was
permissible despite its disparate impact on black applicants. Despite
the defendant’s concession, the Supreme Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibited only intentional discrimination, not
88
conduct having a disparate impact based on race.
3. Dickerson v. United States. Judicial power to raise a new legal
claim sua sponte came up most recently in Dickerson v. United States.
The government had appealed from a district court decision granting
Charles Dickerson’s motion to suppress his confession on the ground
that he had not been read his Miranda rights. Although a federal
statute enacted in 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, purported to override

87. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938).
88. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1976).
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Miranda and set a more lenient standard for the admission of
confessions, the government had a longstanding policy of refusing to
rely on the statute, believing it to be unconstitutional, and thus
argued only that Dickerson’s confession should be admitted against
89
him because he had waived his Miranda rights before confessing.
The Fourth Circuit nonetheless raised the statute sua sponte,
concluding that it was obligated to determine whether § 3501
displaced Miranda despite the parties’ refusal to brief and argue the
question. The panel then held that the statute was constitutional, and
thus that Dickerson’s confession should be admitted without regard
to whether he had been read his rights. The Supreme Court
appointed an amicus to argue in favor of the Fourth Circuit’s
decision, and then reversed without addressing whether the lower
court should have raised the statute on its own motion.
These are just three prominent examples of judicial issue
creation among many instances. Even though judges widely agree
that they should decide cases as framed by the parties, these cases
demonstrate that they are also willing to raise new issues when they
believe that litigants have mischaracterized the law they have asked
90
the courts to apply. These cases carve out important exceptions to
the norm of party presentation, but there has been little attempt by
courts and commentators to articulate a theory of judicial power that
justifies deviation from the norm.

89. The United States had raised 18 U.S.C. § 3501 in the district court, but then had
abandoned the argument in accordance with the United States Department of Justice’s
longstanding policy of refusing to rely on the statute for the admission of confessions. See
Devins, supra note 19, at 252 n.6 (citing Pretrial Rehearing Brief for the United States at 2 n.1,
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999)).
90. See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 445–48
(1993) (stating that a court may raise sua sponte an issue that is “antecedent to . . . and
ultimately dispositive of” the dispute before it because litigants cannot “extract the opinion of a
court on hypothetical Acts of Congress or dubious constitutional principles” simply by
stipulating as to matters of law that are not in fact certain); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,
500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not
limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the
independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (noting that even though the United States had not
asked the Court to review the lower court’s determination that probable cause was absent, it
nonetheless had the “power” to decide the case on this ground if it wished to do so).
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II. DEFENDING JUDICIAL ISSUE CREATION
Lacking a clear rationale, judicial issue creation is widely viewed
as judicial overreaching. Those few scholars who have noted the
dichotomy between rhetoric and practice depict judges who raise new
issues as “policy entrepreneurs,” and express concern that issue
creation erodes the distinction between judicial and legislative
91
power. And when the practice occasionally comes to the attention of
the popular press—such as it did in Dickerson v. United States—
judges are criticized for overstepping their role to further their
92
ideological agendas.
Although this criticism is to be expected, at least in some cases it
is misplaced. Concededly, the norm against issue creation is an
important limit on judicial power that should be honored in the
typical case. But condemning judicial issue creation as equivalent to
legislating from the bench ignores the many valid reasons why courts
raise issues that have been overlooked or ignored by the parties, as
well as the ways in which issue creation can serve to limit, rather than
expand, judicial power. This Part defends the occasional use of
judicial issue creation as an essential tool with which the courts can
protect the integrity of judicial decisionmaking and the law itself.
A. Issue Creation and the Judicial Power to “Say What the Law Is”
Article III has very little to say about how federal courts should
93
go about deciding cases. Nonetheless, some basic principles derived
from the content of that article, as well as from the structure of
government created by the Constitution as a whole, support judicial
power to craft new legal claims and arguments in some cases.
First, it is long established that federal courts have the power to
“say what the law is,” and thus must be able to take notice of legal

91. Kevin T. McGuirre & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691, 699 (1995).
92. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 19, at 252 & n.12 (citing articles criticizing the Fourth
Circuit for sua sponte raising a new issue in Dickerson).
93. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1877–78 (2001) (“Article III invokes but does not define the
‘judicial Power.’ Nor does it specify which procedures federal courts should use to decide cases
or controversies.” (footnote omitted)); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The
Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1364 (1973) (stating that Article III “is itself spare and
unhelpful” on the meaning of judicial power); Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Judicial History, 108
YALE L.J. 1311, 1335 (1999) (“Article III . . . says nothing about the procedures by which courts
vested with the judicial power must or may consider and decide cases . . . .”).
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sources, arguments, and claims omitted by the parties when necessary
to avoid issuing inaccurate or incomplete statements of law. Second,
as a related matter, courts must retain control of the interpretive
process and thus cannot cede to the parties the sources and
arguments that will be used to interpret statutory or constitutional
texts, particularly when doing so could expand the judicial role
beyond its constitutional parameters. And third, the Constitution
guarantees federal judges life tenure and salary protection to ensure
that they can issue pronouncements on legal questions without
interference from the political branches or the public. An inflexible
norm against party presentation would threaten this judicial
independence by giving the parties, and not the courts, control over
judicial pronouncements.
94

1. Law Pronouncement. Since Marbury v. Madison, federal
95
courts have the recognized authority to “say what the law is.” That
phrase is usually cited in support of the judiciary’s power to strike
down state and federal laws that conflict with the federal
96
Constitution. But federal judges are responsible for establishing the
meaning of contested law, not simply invalidating it, and this is the
task that occupies far more of their time. If two parties with a stake in
the matter disagree over the interpretation of a statute, regulation, or
constitutional provision, courts resolve that conflict by publicly
97
stating not only who wins the case but also what the law means.
Locating the answer to disputed questions of law is one of the
federal judiciary’s essential functions. Although Congress and the
president take the lead by enacting statutes and promulgating
regulations, their formal role in establishing the meaning of law ends
when courts are asked to determine how a law passed by the political
branches applies to a specific case or controversy. Members of

94. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
95. Id. at 177.
96. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on
the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (“Marbury not only represents the
fountainhead of judicial review, but also furnishes the canonical statement of the necessary and
appropriate role of courts in the constitutional scheme.”).
97. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[Marbury] declared the basic principle that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the
land . . . .”).
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Congress may file amicus briefs or publish postenactment legislative
history, but those statements customarily are given no more weight
98
than any other party’s opinion. Judicial decisions are not open to
revision either by Congress or the president, no matter how strongly
the political branches disagree with courts’ conclusions about the
99
meaning of law. The political branches can, of course, override a
judicial decision with which they disagree through the constitutional
mechanisms for enacting new law. Unless and until they do so,
however, judicial pronouncements are the law for all the citizens to
follow.
When the parties fail to fully and accurately describe applicable
legal standards, the norm against judicial issue creation comes into
conflict with the judiciary’s law pronouncement power. Because
judicial decisions are objective statements about the meaning of law,
not statements about how the parties subjectively interpret the law,
courts must be able to take notice of legal arguments that the parties
fail to see. If litigants could constrain courts through their own
truncated or inaccurate depictions of the meaning of statutes,
constitutional provisions, and the like, they could effectively wrest
this task away from the courts, putting federal judges in the
impoverished role of picking and choosing from among the litigants’
100
interpretations of the law, rather than their own.

98. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[P]ost-enactment
legislative history is . . . entitled to little weight.”).
99. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995) (holding that Congress cannot
revise final judgments by Article III courts); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792)
(holding that the executive branch cannot revise judgments by Article III courts).
100. Some scholars contend that the Supreme Court has already transferred the judicial
branch’s exclusive authority to interpret law to the executive branch by establishing Chevron
deference. Under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), courts
must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguities in the statutes they administer
even when the judges themselves would have reached a different conclusion, id. at 845, leading
some scholars to characterize Chevron as the “counter-Marbury for the administrative state.”
Cass Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J.
2580, 2589 (2006).
Chevron grants the executive branch, through agencies, a great deal of authority over
what had once been solely the judiciary’s domain. But Chevron deference is highly constrained.
Deference is granted only when agencies are interpreting a statute that Congress has assigned
them to administer, and only after a court finds that the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable. Most important for the discussion here, agency interpretations will
be awarded deference only when announced through formal procedures, such as notice-andcomment rulemaking and formal adjudication, rather than through informal channels such as
letters, guidance documents, or briefs. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27
(2001). Applied under these conditions, Chevron deference is justified on the grounds that
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Some of the exceptions to the party presentation rule discussed
in Part I.B can be understood as judicial efforts to avoid issuing
erroneous statements of law, though the courts did not describe them
this way. By the time Erie reached the Supreme Court, a majority of
Justices had concluded that federal courts lacked statutory and
constitutional authority to craft federal common law. The Court thus
chose to sua sponte overrule Swift v. Tyson rather than continue to
apply its misguided precedent. Likewise, in Washington v. Davis, the
Court disagreed with the parties’ assumption that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibited disparate treatment even in the absence
of an intent to discriminate, and thus was forced to raise the issue on
its own motion rather than decide the case on the parties’ terms.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit applied 18 U.S.C. § 3501 sua sponte in
Dickerson v. United States because it believed (mistakenly) that the
statute provided the correct standard for determining the
admissibility of confessions. In all of these cases, courts were faced
with a dilemma: The court could either decide the case on the parties’
terms, applying the law in accordance with the parties’ inaccurate
representations, or it could raise sua sponte what it believed to be the
correct legal standard.
Admittedly, the courts could have issued decisions in these cases
in accordance with the parties’ view of the law, but then could have
noted that the parties had failed to raise key issues that might have
produced a different holding. Judges regularly insert such
qualifications into their decisions to avoid establishing precedent on a
question not fully briefed by the parties, and perhaps to signal to
future litigants to be sure to argue the point. Such qualifications put
those who read the decision on notice that the court’s view of the law

Congress has delegated to agencies the authority to fill gaps in ambiguous statutes, and that the
combination of agency expertise and political accountability makes them better suited than
courts to do so.
Therefore, however much a step back Chevron takes from Marbury, it does not suggest
that the scope of judicial decisions can be limited by the parties’ interpretation of the law. To
the contrary, the carefully crafted constraints on Chevron deference expose the flaws in an
unyielding rule in favor of party presentation. Such a rule would require courts to adopt
interpretations proposed by parties who have not been delegated interpretive authority by
Congress, who have no claim to expertise or public accountability, and who cannot demonstrate
that their views have been vetted through formal deliberative procedures. Indeed, it would be
extremely odd if courts were required to adopt legal positions agreed upon by parties to
litigation even as the courts were prohibited from deferring to agency interpretation that did
meet all the requirements of Chevron and its progeny. This practice cannot be squared with the
judiciary’s constitutional role to state the meaning of contested federal law.
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might change in a future case, and thus alleviates some of the harm
101
that would arise from inadequate party presentations.
However, issuing this type of qualified opinion—a one-shot,
nonprecedential statement about the law that applies to one set of
litigants only—is not a satisfying solution to the problem. When a
court couches its opinion in such tentative terms, it has abandoned its
law-pronouncement function in favor of resolving the dispute on the
parties’ terms. While this may be the best solution in some cases, it
should not be viewed as the only option available to courts facing this
problem. If it were, parties could regularly force courts to decide
cases on grounds of the parties’ invention that are at odds with
existing law, in the form of decisions that apply only to the parties. In
short, the parties would transform the federal courts from the third
branch of government responsible for declaring the meaning of law
into a private arbitration service working for the parties and no one
102
else. To retain their role in the constitutional structure, judges must
have the ability to raise new issues when failing to do so would result
in an inaccurate statement of the law that applies solely to the parties
before the court.
Critics of issue creation would likely argue that the judiciary’s
law-pronouncement function should not be given priority over
competing values. They would agree that courts should of course
strive to get the law right, but they would note that this goal is often
trumped by various institutional limits on judicial power. For
example, illegal conduct goes uncorrected anytime a party fails to
bring a lawsuit challenging the erroneous application of law, or is
barred from doing so by constitutional or prudential limits on federal
jurisdiction. Furthermore, a number of judicial doctrines—such as
stare decisis, law of the case, res judicata, and the requirement that
lower courts adhere to superior court precedent—require judges to
accept flawed legal determinations and incorporate them into current
103
decisions. Finally, the waiver doctrine, which bars a party from

101. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 100 n.5 (1991) (stating that
when the parties fail to fully and accurately describe the law, courts should be careful to avoid
“issuing an opinion that could reasonably be understood by lower courts and nonparties to
establish binding circuit precedent on the issue decided”).
102. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in
the United States, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 passim (2004) (criticizing unpublished decisions on
these grounds).
103. Stare decisis is the judicial policy in favor of adhering to past precedent. Law of the
case is the principle followed by appellate courts of refusing to alter a previous appellate
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raising a new argument on appeal, suggests that courts are willing to
place administrative concerns such as finality above accuracy in legal
decisionmaking. These rules all suggest that getting the law right
104
sometimes takes a back seat to other priorities.
Aside from the doctrine of waiver, however, none of these rules
of practice requires courts to base their decisions on erroneous
statements of law by nonjudicial actors, and thus do not pose the
same threat to judicial power. For example, if an illegal practice is
never challenged in court, then the judiciary is never put in the
position of having to sanction that conduct. Judicial inaction simply
does not raise the same concerns as judicial decisions premised on
inaccurate statements of the law.
Likewise, although doctrines such as stare decisis, res judicata,
and law of the case may require a court to affirm what it believes to
be an incorrect statement of the law, the source of the flawed legal
analysis in such cases is another court, not a nonjudicial actor. Thus,
these doctrines do not deprive courts of their control over law
pronouncement. Allowing the first-in-time decision to stand seems
reasonable as a matter of policy because it allows citizens to rely on
the first judicial pronouncement on a question of law, but does so
105
without undermining the authority of the judicial branch. In
contrast, if courts were forced to decide cases based on the parties’
inaccurate descriptions of the law, these non-judicial actors could coopt courts into issuing decisions affirming their erroneous view of the
106
law.
determination made in the same case in an earlier appeal. Res judicata is the policy that a final
judgment rendered by a court with competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the questions
involved between the parties and their privies. All three doctrines thus require, or at least
strongly encourage, courts to adhere to previous decisions with which they may disagree.
104. See, e.g., LANDSMAN, supra note 43, at 34–37 (stating that none of the faults attributed
to the adversarial system are so serious as to warrant the abandonment of adversary procedure).
105. Furthermore, it is worth noting that stare decisis is not an unyielding doctrine. If a
reviewing court concludes that a prior decision is truly wrong, it has the power to overrule that
precedent. And if a lower court believes that an intervening line of Supreme Court cases or a
new Act of Congress overrules a higher court’s earlier ruling, then it can refuse to follow what it
concludes is a now-defunct precedent. Thus, these doctrines will give way at times to the need
for accurate legal opinions.
106. There are additional good reasons to require lower court obeisance to the decisions
reached by reviewing courts. Our hierarchical federal court system is premised, in large part, on
the assumption that higher courts are more likely to get the law right. Higher courts sit in
multijudge panels that allow for the benefit of deliberation and discussion; these courts have
more time to decide each case; and these judges are (supposedly) superior legal intellects. See
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Lower Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 817, 837–49 (1994).
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Admittedly, the doctrine of waiver is closely related to the party
presentation rule, in that it appears to sacrifice accuracy in legal
opinions for the benefits of finality. Appellate courts regularly declare
that new claims and even new legal arguments raised for the first time
on appeal are waived, regardless of their merits, resulting in judicial
opinions that do not address a relevant question of law. One
important purpose of the waiver rule is to prevent parties from raising
arguments at the appellate stage that require development of new
facts not already in the record. Remanding for a new round of
discovery would be time consuming, and deciding the case without a
full record on the issue would be unfair to both parties. Thus, for
purposes of judicial economy and to avoid prejudice, courts apply the
waiver rule to bar new arguments that require factual development
on appeal.
A strictly applied rule of waiver, like a strictly applied rule of
party presentation, sacrifices accuracy in judicial decisionmaking,
potentially undermining the courts’ law-pronouncement function.
Thus, the arguments presented here in favor of judicial issue creation
would also support a relaxation of the waiver doctrine. It is not
surprising, then, that just as courts violate the party presentation rule
to avoid issuing inaccurate statements of law, they are also willing to
overlook waiver when the new argument goes to the heart of the
claims on which they must rule. Courts apply waiver stringently when
the parties come up with a whole new legal claim or theory. But when
the new argument recharacterizes an existing claim or adds new
sources or a new spin on an existing argument, courts are less rigid in
their application of that rule. This Article suggests that courts have
good reasons to relax the waiver doctrine, just as they should make
exceptions to the party presentation rule, when failing to do so would
undermine their law-pronouncement function.
2. The Interpretive Process. Courts not only have the power to
declare the meaning of law; they also have the discretion to choose
how to interpret it. Neither task should be taken over by nonjudicial
actors. To maintain control over the interpretive process, judges must
step in at times and add to or alter the parties’ arguments.
Of course, there is no single accepted method of interpretation.
When asked to determine the meaning of a provision of the United
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States Constitution, some judges approach the task as textualists,
108
and some as proponents of a “living
others as originalists,
109
Constitution.” When it comes to interpreting statutes, judges differ
over whether to look to the intentions of the legislature and the
broader purpose of the legislative enactment, or to limit their analysis
to the statute’s plain language. Judges disagree over when and
whether to apply countless canons of construction, in part because
these canons embody policy choices and “reflect constitutionally
110
111
inspired values” over which they also part ways. Each judge has
the authority to employ the interpretive approach she thinks is best.
Academics debate the degree to which Congress could enact
legislation that purported to control the judiciary’s interpretive
methodology, especially its interpretation of legislative enactments.
Some argue that Congress has significant leeway to tell the courts
how to interpret its statutes, while others contend that the
112
Constitution prohibits legislative interference in the judicial process.
107. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice,
56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1409 (2009) (quoting an interview in which Justice Scalia stated that he
is a textualist).
108. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 562–68 (2006) (discussing and criticizing
originalism).
109. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV.
693, 695 (1976) (discussing the interpretive philosophy premised on the idea of a “living
Constitution”).
110. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 652 n.308 (1995); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 599 (1992) (noting that courts attempt to construct
congressional acts so as to avoid constitutional questions).
111. The Court’s presumption against the preemption of state law, for example, is rooted in
respect for state sovereignty. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“So
we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”).
The rule of lenity, which requires a court to give a criminal defendant the benefit of any
ambiguity within a statutory text, is a quasi-constitutionally based rule of construction derived
from the notion that citizens must be given fair warning before they can be punished and that
Congress, not courts, should make the moral judgments behind criminal sanctions. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1475 (2008). The
absurdity doctrine enables even textualists to deviate from the plain language of a statute if such
a reading would produce an absurd result. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2419 (2003) (noting that the absurdity doctrine is viewed as a
“qualification to textual interpretation”).
112. Compare Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2002) (arguing that Congress has the authority to create federal
rules of statutory interpretation), and John Harrison, Essay, The Power of Congress over the
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The issue is complicated, and the answer likely depends on whether
Congress is using control over interpretation to further its role as
policymaker, or whether it is seeking to manipulate judicial power
and displace the judiciary’s interpretive function (and that is a hard
line to draw). But whatever one’s views on Congress’s power over
judicial interpretation, the claim here is that litigants cannot
manipulate the interpretive process through their litigation choices.
Accordingly, if two committed textualist litigants present their
divergent views of the plain meaning of a statutory text to an
intentionalist judge, that judge can explore the legislative history and
113
issue a decision that turns on that history. That proposition is
relatively uncontroversial, because there is no new issue created here,
and thus no transgression of the norm against judicial issue creation.
But what if the litigants fail to argue that the court must go beyond
the plain text of the statute to avoid an absurd result? Or neglect to
cite another provision of the statute containing similar language that
114
sheds light on the disputed provision? Or refuse to argue that the
court adopt an interpretation that would avoid a constitutional
115
question? The answer must be that the party presentation principle
gives way when the litigants’ interpretive philosophy differs from that
of the judge, for otherwise litigants could force judges to apply the
interpretive methodology that the litigants prefer.
Concededly, the issue rarely arises because litigants typically
adopt any interpretive philosophy that allows them to prevail, and
will usually claim they win under alternative readings of a statute. A
plaintiff challenging the government’s interpretation of a statute
would likely argue that the statute’s text clearly supports her position,
and that the legislative history confirms the text, and that various
canons of construction support the plaintiff’s reading. But
occasionally litigants will neglect an important line of reasoning,
Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 505 (2000) (arguing that Congress can abrogate stare
decisis), with Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 194–95 (2001) (asserting that “Congress does not
have the power to tell the federal courts how to go about their business of deciding cases”).
113. See, e.g., Phillips/May Corp. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1264, 1270 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(noting that neither party cited legislative history that the court found dispositive of a legal
question in the case).
114. Cf. United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier, 380 F.3d 488, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(noting that the court has the authority to remedy errors sua sponte when the parties’ failure to
plead a particular issue seriously affects “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings”).
115. See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457 (1960).
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either through oversight or due to their litigation agenda. For
116
example, in Gonzales v. Carhart, Planned Parenthood Federation of
America chose not to argue that the partial birth abortion statute was
an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce even though
that argument would have appealed to at least a few Justices,
presumably because Planned Parenthood disagreed with that
117
conclusion as a matter of both law and policy. Institutional litigants,
including the federal government, will avoid citing and relying on
doctrines they dislike and lines of precedent they hope will be
overturned. In such cases, judges should have the discretion to go
beyond the arguments in the parties’ briefs, because failure to do so
would let litigants control an essential aspect of the judicial function.
The problem is particularly acute when parties fail to adhere to
the constitutional avoidance doctrine, which requires that judges
adopt conservative interpretations of statutes and regulations to steer
well clear of constitutional lines. The doctrine serves important
institutional interests: it ensures that courts do not needlessly strike
down legislative enactments, allowing judges to evade conflict with
the other branches of government; it leads to interpretations that best
accord with Congress’s intentions, since Congress presumably does
not wish to enact constitutionally suspect legislation; and it enables
courts to avoid issuing near-immutable pronouncements on the
118
meaning of the Constitution.
Litigants will not always share the judiciary’s interest in
promoting the values underlying the constitutional avoidance
doctrine, however. If a litigant prefers the constitutionally suspect
interpretation, then that party has no incentive to argue for the
alternative, constitutionally sound construction. Indeed, sometimes
litigants turn to the courts precisely because they distrust the political
branches and believe that their interests can best be served by
independent judges, who they hope will declare the scope of their
constitutional rights in the broadest possible terms. Nor will litigants
have any particular interest in avoiding conflict between the courts

116. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
117. See, e.g., id. at 1640 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I also note that whether the Act
constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause is not before
the Court. The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is outside the question presented; and
the lower courts did not address it.”).
118. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1202–08 (2006) (describing the rationales for the constitutional avoidance
canon). But see id. at 1208–09 (critiquing the rationales for the constitutional avoidance canon).
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and the political branches, or in cabining judicial decisions about the
119
meaning of the Constitution. For all of these reasons, sometimes no
party will argue in favor of the most constitutionally conservative
interpretation, forcing judges to do so on their own motion.
In the past, the Supreme Court has resolved cases on grounds
outside the questions presented to avoid a constitutional issue, though
usually without providing much explanation for doing so. For
120
example, in Boynton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the Court
agreed to hear the case of an African-American interstate bus
passenger who was arrested after refusing to leave the whites-only
section of a bus terminal restaurant. The petition presented two
constitutional questions: “first, whether the conviction of petitioner
[was] invalid as a burden on commerce in violation of Art. I, § 8, cl. 3
of the Constitution; and second, whether the conviction violate[d] the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
121
Amendment.” Writing for the majority, Justice Black admitted that
“[o]rdinarily we limit our review to the questions presented in an
application for certiorari,” but decided that it was “appropriate” for
the Court to conclude that the discrimination against AfricanAmerican passengers violated the Interstate Commerce Act so as to
122
avoid petitioner’s “two broad constitutional questions.” Likewise, in
123
Neese v. Southern Railway Co., the Supreme Court refused to
decide whether an appellate court had jurisdiction to reverse a trial
court’s denial of a motion for a new trial. The Court instead reversed
the appellate court on the ground that, even assuming it had such
124
power, its decision was an abuse of discretion. The Court explained:
“We need not consider respondent’s contention that only the
jurisdictional question was presented by the petition for certiorari”
because “we follow the traditional practice of this Court of refusing to
decide constitutional questions when the record discloses other
grounds of decision, whether or not they have been properly raised
125
before us by the parties.”
119. Id. at 1220–21 (stating that the executive branch does not share the judiciary’s
institutional limitations (such as its countermajoritarian status), and thus does not need to
employ the constitutional avoidance canon in the same way a court would).
120. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
121. Id. at 457.
122. Id.
123. Neese v. S. Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77 (1955.)
124. Id. at 77.
125. Id. at 78.
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As these examples demonstrate, issue creation can be a method
by which courts constrain judicial power in response to litigants who
would prefer to expand it. When judges inject new issues into
litigation, they are often accused of acting as legislators—that is, of
overstepping boundaries on judicial power to implement their
126
personal ideological agenda. But ceding to the parties control over
the issues presented in a case could just as easily undermine wellestablished doctrines by which courts seek to limit the breadth of
their decisions. In short, issue creation can be an act of judicial
restraint.
Likewise, the philosophy of judicial minimalism requires that
judges be able to modify or supplement the parties’ arguments.
Minimalists favor incremental steps over sweeping changes in legal
norms because they fear that broadly worded decisions will
undermine democratic processes, lead to unintended consequences,
127
and put in place rigid rules that leave no flexibility for the future.
Minimalists advocate a profoundly modest role for the courts out of a
belief that the political branches, and not the countermajoritarian
courts, should make most of the important policy decisions for the
country.
At first glance, judicial issue creation appears to be the antithesis
of minimalism. Allowing judges to transgress the limits of the parties’
arguments gives them the power to set their own agendas—a power
normally reserved for the political branches. Judges might abuse that
discretion by raising issues that are unnecessary to resolve the parties’
dispute, enabling them to engage in policymaking through advisory
opinions. But judges might also raise new issues to narrow the scope
of their decisions, thwarting litigants who would prefer a maximalist
128
judicial decision over a minimalist one. In an era in which litigation,
especially appellate litigation, can be as much about establishing
precedent as resolving individual disputes, litigants may seek court
126. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 291; Milani & Smith, supra note 58, at 285–90;
Miller, supra note 68, at 1256–58, 1261.
127. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (describing the minimalist philosophy).
128. Here I disagree with Professor Chad Oldfather, who argues that if judges avoid broad,
rule-based decisions, they can avoid the problem of going beyond parties’ arguments. Oldfather,
supra note 22, at 137–38 & n.51. He assumes that deficiencies in the parties’ case presentation
will prevent the court from adopting the appropriate broad rule of general application, but
overlooks the possibility that the opposite problem will occur. That is, the parties might present
only the broad-brush arguments to the courts, omitting case-specific claims that would narrow
the scope of the court’s decision.
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rulings on questions that could easily be avoided. Institutional
litigants in particular may ask courts to pronounce on new questions
of constitutional law, overturn long-established precedent, or make
sweeping statements about the meaning of a statute or treaty, when a
much narrower and less significant legal issue could resolve the case.
The judiciary’s best method of narrowing decisions may be to alter
the questions posed by the parties.
3. Judicial Independence.
Article III courts can only
meaningfully realize their power to “say what the law is” and to
employ their preferred interpretive methods because they are
insulated from political pressure by Article III’s life tenure and salary
130
guarantees. These protections allow judges to issue decisions that
conflict with the political branches’ preferences, or with public
opinion, without fear of reprisal. Judicial decisions lack some of the
legitimacy enjoyed by the political branches because federal judges
are not elected, and thus not accountable, to the people subject to
131
their rulings. By the same token, however, judicial articulations of
the law have greater credibility than those of the political branches
precisely because courts are not beholden to interest groups and
132
other political actors. Whatever biases federal judges bring to the
table, the public knows that their decisions are not crafted to curry
133
favor with political parties or special interests.

129. Cf. Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–15
(2000) (analyzing empirical evidence demonstrating that institutional litigants seek to
manipulate precedent); id. at 22 (describing individual litigants’ “sociotropic goal of setting a
precedent that would assist others who may be similarly situated future plaintiffs”); Marc
Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–103 (1974) (noting that repeat players are concerned about the
effects of litigation beyond the immediate case).
130. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
131. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 354 (1998) (describing the
“countermajoritarian criticism” as “a challenge to the legitimacy or propriety of judicial review
on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the will of the people, or a majority of the people,
whose will, it is implied, should be sovereign in a democracy”).
132. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 708 (1995) (“[T]he federal judiciary’s independence is widely
thought to enhance its authority . . . .”).
133. The possibility of elevation to a higher court, however, could influence judicial
decisions. Jonathan Remy Nash, Essay, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2196 n.83
(2006).
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Judicial independence, and the respect for judicial
decisionmaking that accompanies it, would be compromised if courts
were required to rule on the law as it is presented to them, rather
than as they believe it to be. Life tenure and salary protection ensure
that federal judges cannot be threatened or coerced by litigants who
want them to ignore specific statutes or interpret constitutional
provisions as the litigants prefer. Yet litigants could accomplish the
same result simply by omitting sources, claims, and arguments if
courts were not free to raise overlooked statutes or adopt new
interpretations of the law they are asked to apply.
Furthermore, if judges are not permitted to question litigants’
articulation of the law, then courts can be co-opted by litigants
seeking to benefit from the credibility of a judicial decision that
describes the law as they see it. The cases discussed in Part I.B
illustrate the point. For instance, a judicial decision in Dickerson v.
United States discussing Miranda and not 18 U.S.C. § 3501 would have
bestowed legitimacy on the executive’s claim that § 3501 did not
displace Miranda, and yet the executive’s independent conclusion
that § 3501 is unconstitutional would never have been tested.
Likewise, in Washington v. Davis, the Court made clear that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibited only intentional racial
discrimination, and thereby avoided an opinion affirming the parties’
view that it applied to conduct having a disparate impact only.
Granted, the Court could have issued decisions in each case stating
explicitly that it was not deciding these issues because the parties had
failed to raise them. But judges should have the discretion to object to
the parties’ flawed descriptions of the law when failing to do so would
put courts in a position of implicitly affirming the parties’ views.
Were it otherwise, litigants could manipulate judicial power to
obtain policy outcomes they desire without changing underlying legal
standards—a result that courts forbid in other contexts. For example,
although Congress has great latitude over federal jurisdiction, it
would be on shaky ground if it attempted to strip federal courts of
jurisdiction whenever it feared the court would issue a decision it did
not like. Congress attempted something akin to this in a
Reconstruction-era statute providing compensation for “loyal”
southerners whose property had been seized by the Union during the
Civil War. Courts began awarding compensation to southerners who
had supported secession, but had subsequently been pardoned by
President Lincoln. Unhappy with that result, Congress amended the
statute to eliminate Supreme Court jurisdiction over any case in
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which a former “rebel” asserted a presidential pardon as the basis for
134
his claim for compensation. In United States v. Klein, the Supreme
135
Court struck down that statute as unconstitutional. Although the
Court’s reasoning was murky, some federal courts scholars have
suggested that the real problem with the statute was that it was
making a substantive policy choice (no compensation for pardoned
southerners), but did so behind the guise of a policy-neutral
136
jurisdictional question. Thus, Congress sought to benefit from
judicial decisions denying southerners compensation without
137
changing the substance of the federal policy. Likewise, when parties
obtain judgments on manufactured questions of law, they acquire the
approval of an apolitical, independent court for policy choices that
were never enacted into law.
The judiciary’s independence is also essential to avoid the
concentration of lawmaking and law-exposition powers in the hands
of one branch of government—a goal that could be undermined if
courts never reframed issues presented by the executive branch acting
138
as litigant. Members of the political branches know that judicial
decisions may shape statutes, and thus these lawmakers are well
aware that issues left unaddressed in legislation will be resolved by
the independent courts, who may interpret statutes in ways these
lawmakers dislike. The judiciary’s independence from these two
branches guards against attempts by the political branches to control
law at the back end—that is, when it is being applied to specific
individuals. The political branches would be tempted to apply the law
differently in cases in which it would be politically expedient to do so;
134. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128 (1872).
135. Id. at 146–48.
136. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception,
Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United
States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 450 (2006) (“The end result was that while the
controlling substantive law purportedly remained the same, in reality the essence of that law
had been effectively transformed into something very different.”).
137. Lawrence Sager stated the “first principle” of Klein as follows: “The judiciary will not
allow itself to be made to speak and act against its own best judgment on matters within its
competence which have great consequence for our political community. The judiciary will not
permit its articulate authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic to its actual judgment;
the judiciary will resist efforts to make it seem to support and regularize that with which it in
fact disagrees.” Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J.
2525, 2529 (1998).
138. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretation of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 645–54 (1996) (discussing the
importance of the separation of lawmaking from law exposition).
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only the judiciary is insulated from such pressures through its life
tenure and salary protections. Judicial independence ensures that
laws are applied fairly, and that like cases are treated alike (or at least
not treated differently to curry political favor). The judiciary thus
protects against the abuses that occur when the same branch of
government has the power to both make the law and apply it in
139
specific cases.
If courts were required to let the parties control case
presentation, then the executive, acting as litigant, could adopt
different interpretations of statutes and constitutional provisions in
different cases. For example, the executive branch conceivably could
choose whether to argue for admission of evidence under either
Miranda or 18 U.S.C. § 3501, selecting one or the other depending on
its preference in each case (until the statute was found
unconstitutional, of course). Litigants could even rely on statutes that
had been repealed, or seek the benefit of broader interpretations of
constitutional rights than had been recognized, making case-by-case
decisions as to which version of the law to present to the courts. Such
cases are unusual, because normally one party or the other will assert
the correct legal standard. But there are nonetheless plenty of cases
on the books in which parties either inadvertently or intentionally
140
omitted the relevant legal claim. Courts must have the power to
prevent litigants—and in particular the executive branch—from
picking and choosing their preferred legal interpretations on a caseby-case basis. If courts did not have this authority, litigants could
undermine the Framers’ intention to insulate law declaration from
outside influence.
B. Issue Creation and Limits on Government Power
The Framers intended for the federal courts to enforce
constitutional restrictions on governmental power. As Alexander
Hamilton explained it, the
complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution [because] . . . . [l]imitations of this kind can
be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of

139. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 143, at 76 (C.B. MacPherson
ed., 1980) (1690) (“[I]t may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power for
the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to
execute them, whereby they exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make . . . .”).
140. See supra notes 3–17 and Part I.C.
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courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to
the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to
141
nothing.

To serve this purpose, courts must be free to take notice of
constitutional transgressions by the government even when the
litigants would prefer not to raise those issues.
Of course, even the most blatantly unconstitutional laws and
practices will proceed unimpeded by judicial review if no one has
standing to raise them, or if those with standing choose not to bring
their case to a court. Courts are not charged with enforcing the
Constitution in the abstract, and may do so only in the context of
142
specific cases and controversies. Constitutional violations often
occur outside the purview of courts. Thus, one could argue that
judges similarly have no authority to enforce constitutional
limitations in the context of specific cases in which the parties fail to
raise them.
There is a significant difference, however, between a
constitutional violation that does not form the basis of a justiciable
case or controversy, and one that arises within a case that a court is
required to hear and resolve. Pursuant to Article III, federal courts
may only decide “Cases” or “Controversies,” and thus cannot address
constitutional issues in the abstract. Courts were not intended to
serve as roving commissions, seeking out constitutional errors and
correcting them even when no individual has standing to seek judicial
review. But that restriction on judicial power does not justify a court’s
refusal to raise a constitutional question that goes to the heart of a
case before it, and which the court is required to decide. If the parties
ask the court to issue an order that is itself unconstitutional, or that is
based on a constitutionally suspect legislative or executive command,
courts certainly have the power, if not the obligation, to raise a
constitutional infirmity overlooked or ignored by the parties. In short,
the fact that courts cannot set their agenda does not mean that
litigants can co-opt them into applying unconstitutional laws to
achieve unconstitutional purposes.
Judicial power to raise constitutional infirmities sua sponte finds
further support in well-established doctrine requiring federal judges

141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
142. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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to satisfy themselves of their jurisdiction to preside over a dispute.
A lawyer must always be ready to respond to a federal judge’s queries
regarding the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case, even if neither
party raised the question. Litigants may not, through their mutual
consent, obtain a judicial opinion on a matter outside of the subject
matter headings listed in Article III. If courts could preside over cases
beyond the limits of their constitutional and statutorily assigned
authority whenever the parties wanted them to, they would impinge
on the power of the political branches and usurp the role of state
144
courts —structural and institutional interests not always shared by
the individual litigants. Accordingly, judges are required to satisfy
themselves of their own jurisdiction no matter what the parties may
think.
These same rationales suggest that judges should also take notice
of nonjurisdictional constitutional questions in cases in which they are
asked to play a role in enabling one of the other branches to
transgress the limits on its authority. If Congress has enacted a clearly
unconstitutional statute—for instance, a statute that goes beyond its
power under the Commerce Clause, or that establishes an
unconstitutional condition on federal funding—then a judicial
decision applying that statute permits Congress to exceed its
constitutional authority. Why should judges be required to police the
boundaries of their own power, and yet be helpless to check
overstepping by the political branches simply because the parties fail
to raise the matter? Likewise, if the parties misconstrue the
Constitution, the Court should have the power to correct their mutual
error rather than compound it by issuing a decision based on the
parties’ misreading of the Constitution’s text.
Several of the cases discussed in Part I.B illustrate this principle.
In Washington v. Davis, the Court concluded that intentional
discrimination is a necessary element of an equal protection violation,
even though neither party raised that question. The Court chose to
deviate from the norm against issue creation to avoid writing a
decision that it believed incorrectly characterized constitutional limits
on government action. Likewise, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court held that
the Constitution’s exclusionary rule applied to the states despite the
fact that neither party made that argument, again choosing
constitutional accuracy over the norm of party presentation.
143. See supra Part I.A.
144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 42.
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C. Issue Creation as a Safeguard of Legislative Power
Judicial issue creation can safeguard legislative power by
preventing the parties from ignoring or misrepresenting statutes. An
incompetent lawyer can all too easily overlook or misconstrue a
statute. Alternatively, a party might purposefully choose to avoid
citing a relevant statute, or ignore a reasonable interpretation of a
statute, for any number of reasons: the party might want the court to
address a constitutional issue that could be avoided were a statute on
point, or the relevant statute might be at odds with other aspects of a
party’s litigation agenda, or the party might conclude that the statute
is unconstitutional and thus cannot be relied upon. Dickerson is an
example of the last possibility: the Department of Justice had a
longstanding policy against asserting 18 U.S.C. § 3501 as a basis for
the admission of confessions because it believed that the statute was
unconstitutional. Courts can only ensure that statutes are applied
accurately by questioning litigants’ interpretations and searching out
relevant statutes that the litigants have ignored.
The problem is exacerbated in cases involving the executive
branch. The executive is the most frequent litigator before the federal
courts, it has long-term interests that are at times opposed to those of
Congress, and it has a constitutional obligation to determine
independently both the meaning and constitutionality of the laws it
enforces. Under Article II, the president takes an oath to “preserve,
145
protect and defend the Constitution,” and has the power and duty
146
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” which of
necessity requires first locating the correct meaning of a legal text.
Furthermore, the executive has prosecutorial discretion to prioritize
147
its enforcement of the laws enacted by Congress. Thousands of law
review pages have been devoted to defending the executive’s
independent authority to determine the constitutionality of the
statutes it administers, its right to refuse to enforce statutes when it

145. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
146. Id. art. II, § 3.
147. William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 831, 875–86 (2001) (“As part of the execution of the law, the Executive must
decide whether to litigate and what legal positions the Administration will advance.” (footnote
omitted)).
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concludes they are unconstitutional, and its power to interpret laws as
148
it sees best.
Under even the broadest conception of executive power,
however, there are limits on the executive’s independent authority to
interpret and apply the law. Scholars generally agree that the
executive has to obey Supreme Court pronouncements about the
meaning of the Constitution, even when the executive disagrees with
149
the Court. And the executive cannot simply ignore laws, treaties,
and regulations it dislikes when those sources of law require that the
executive take specific action. Finally, the Constitution itself limits the
executive’s interpretation and implementation of the law. For
example, the executive cannot selectively enforce laws against some
racial groups but not others, nor can it use its power to target its
political enemies for disfavored treatment.
A stringently applied rule against judicial issue creation would
give the executive the option to ignore these limits on its authority to
interpret and implement the law, and would do so at the expense of
both legislative and judicial power. If a court cannot correct an
executive misinterpretation of federal law, or raise a statute or treaty
that the executive has chosen to ignore, then it enables the executive
to displace the legislative and judicial roles in lawmaking and law
pronouncement, respectively.
Again, Dickerson provides an example of the problem. Congress
enacted a statute that purported to override Miranda. As the Court
described it, the validity of the statute turned on whether the Miranda
Court “announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its
supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of
150
congressional direction.” If the former, then the statute was
unconstitutional and Miranda governed; if the latter, the statute
would displace Miranda and set the standard for the admission of
confessions. The executive branch concluded that the statute was
unconstitutional, and thus refused to rely on it as a basis for the
admission of confessions—a decision well within the prosecutor’s
discretion. But if courts were bound to decide cases solely on the

148. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 321–43 (1994).
149. Morrison, supra note 118, at 1224 (“The conventional view . . . is that the executive
branch is indeed bound by the Supreme Court’s determination that a given statute or
governmental action is unconstitutional.”).
150. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 429, 437 (2000).
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parties’ terms, then the executive’s litigation position would in
essence repeal the statute. Rigid adherence to the norm against issue
creation would give the executive branch authority to ask courts to
decide laws on the executive’s terms, and not the legislature’s,
upending the constitutionally assigned roles for these branches.
Even more worrisome, the executive would have the power to
establish the meaning of the law at the back end, when the law is
being applied to individuals before the courts. As previously
discussed, permitting the political branches to interpret the law in
individual cases is troubling because their very political accountability
raises the fear that they will apply the law unfairly to gain political
151
advantage. The Framers provided judges with life tenure and salary
protection in part to ensure that law is applied impartially in
individual cases, a role that judges can only fulfill if they have the
power to raise issues ignored by the parties when necessary.
These concerns arise whenever any litigant misrepresents the law
and a judge decides the case on that litigant’s terms. But the problem
is particularly acute when it comes to the executive branch because of
the frequency with which that branch appears before the federal
courts, and because it is often the only entity able to litigate about the
152
meaning of specific statutes, treaties, and constitutional provisions.
In light of its dominant role in federal litigation, the executive could
systematically alter the meaning of federal law absent judicial
intervention in case presentation. Finally, unlike a private litigant, the
executive can combine its power to shape law as a litigant with its
broad authority to interpret and enforce the law, thereby exercising
extraordinary influence over the application of the law in individual
153
cases.
Congress is well aware of the problem of executive infidelity to
its statutory commands, and has passed legislation attempting to
protect its legislative enactments when the executive refuses to do so.
By statute, the Attorney General must inform Congress when the
Attorney General or any other officer of the Department of Justice
adopts a policy of refusing to enforce or defend a federal statute, rule,
program, or policy, and in such cases Congress may submit amicus

151. See supra text accompanying notes 138–39.
152. See Devins, supra note 19, at 272–79.
153. Cf. Manning, supra note 138, at 680–85 (asserting that deference to agency
interpretation of agency rules violates the separation of powers principle that lawmaking should
be kept separate from law exposition).
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briefs and make arguments to the courts about why executive
154
nonenforcement is misguided. Unfortunately, there is no similar
means of protection when the executive branch adopts an
interpretation of a federal statute that is at odds with Congress’s
155
intent. In these cases, the judiciary serves as guardian of the
integrity of statutory commands that might otherwise go unheeded.
D. Issue Creation and the Common Law System
The presumption against introducing new issues into litigation is
also incompatible with the power of precedent in a common law
system. The federal courts of appeals issue decisions that apply not
only to the parties before the court but that also bind all the judges on
that court and the district courts within that circuit. Lower courts
have no choice but to obey even wrongheaded decisions of their
superiors. Although a court’s obligation to follow its own precedent is
not unyielding, stare decisis is nonetheless a hard doctrine to
156
overcome. Every circuit court has adopted a rule mandating that a
panel cannot overturn the decision of a previous panel absent an
intervening decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that changes the
157
law. Even those courts with the authority to overrule precedent,
such as courts of appeals sitting en banc and the U.S. Supreme Court,
rarely upset settled law. Precedent that is viewed as mistaken will
nonetheless be followed by these courts absent “special
158
justification.”

154. 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2006). When signing the most recent version of this statute into law,
President Bush issued a statement that the executive branch would construe the statute “in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary
executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign
relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance
of the Executive’s constitutional duties.” Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of
Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2010, 2010 (Nov. 2, 2002).
Presumably, then, the Bush administration envisioned circumstances under which it would not
inform Congress of its refusal to enforce a federal statute or rule. See Trevor W. Morrison,
Executive Branch Avoidance and the Need for Congressional Notification, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR (2007), http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/executive-branch-avoidance-andthe-need-for-congressional-notification.
155. See Morrison, supra note 154.
156. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1017
(2003) (“[P]recedent does operate to preclude litigants in the mainstream of cases.”).
157. Id at 1017–18.
158. For example, in Dickerson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its Miranda decision,
concluding there was no “special justification” for overturning a longstanding precedent.
Although Dickerson did not affirmatively embrace Miranda’s rationale, the majority
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The power of precedent can be undermined by litigants in two
ways. First, if litigants fail to fairly, completely, and accurately
describe the law, judicial opinions may themselves contain flawed
statements of law that will bind all who come after. Second, if litigants
fail to cite and discuss binding precedent, they may evade its
application unless the court raises the precedent sua sponte. In either
case, allowing the parties’ incomplete presentations to taint judicial
decisions is troubling in a common law system in which precedent
controls the results in subsequent litigation.
1. Creating Precedent. A judicial decision that misstates the law
because the parties passed over important arguments or failed to cite
relevant statutes and legal opinions nonetheless stands as the last
word. The conscientious lawyer advising a client on her legal
obligations should note that a particular precedent is poorly reasoned,
overlooks key issues, and might be overruled or at least distinguished
upon a convincing reargument. But it would be imprudent for a
lawyer to suggest that the decision may be blithely ignored.
Particularly troubling is when the parties raise all the relevant
legal claims, but fail to make the most compelling arguments in
support of those claims, which may lead to the creation of flawed
precedent by the court. The Supreme Court has been sensitive to this
159
problem in the past. In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, the
Court concluded that it could turn to state law standards to fill gaps in
a federal statute, even though the parties had not timely raised the
160
applicability of state law. The Court explained: “When an issue or
claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the
particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains
the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction
161
of governing law.” The Court noted in a footnote that judges are
never obligated to raise a legal argument waived by a party, but
cautioned that if a court of appeals “undertakes to sanction a litigant
by deciding an effectively raised claim according to a truncated body
of law, the court should refrain from issuing an opinion that could
nonetheless refused to abandon it, citing stare decisis as its primary justification: “Whether or
not we would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the
issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.”
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
159. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
160. Id. at 99.
161. Id.
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reasonably be understood by lower courts and nonparties to establish
162
binding circuit precedent on the issue decided.” In short, Kamen
defended a court’s power to raise a new legal argument to avoid
issuing an opinion containing erroneous statements of law, in part to
prevent the creation of flawed precedent.
As discussed in Part I, the norm against issue creation is often
defended on grounds specific to the parties before the court. For
example, judges will assert that the parties have waived an issue, or
failed to adequately brief it, and thus a court will penalize the party
by refusing to consider the question. But these litigant-specific
rationales for the norm cannot justify issuing incorrect statements of
law that will bind, or at least affect, all those similarly situated to the
parties before the court. If appellate courts were akin to private
arbitrators, issuing decisions that were relevant only to the parties
before them, then it would make sense for the court to impose harsh
consequences on those who failed to adhere to the rules. But in light
of the precedential nature of judicial decisionmaking, the personal
failings of the parties before the court do not provide a sufficient
rationale for overlooking compelling and relevant arguments that the
parties failed to raise. In short, an inflexible norm of party
presentation is more appropriate for a system of private dispute
resolution than one that combines dispute resolution with public law
declaration.
2. Protecting Precedent. Just as it is important for courts to
respect stare decisis, it is essential that litigants not be allowed to slip
its bonds simply by refusing to cite established precedent. Stare
decisis is an important limit on judicial discretion, providing stability
163
and predictability in the interpretation of law. The United States
inherited an English legal tradition in which judges were guided by
prior decisions and canons of construction, and at least theoretically
were not free to make unconstrained pronouncements on the
meaning of the law. Alexander Hamilton explained that like their
English counterparts, federal judges would be “bound down by strict
rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in
164
every particular case that comes before them.” As one legal

162. Id. at 100 n.5.
163. Molot, supra note 28, at 72 (discussing how stare decisis serves as a constraint on
judicial discretion).
164. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 471.
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historian put it, “the doctrine of precedent” was “viewed [by the
Framers] as a means of controlling judges’ discretion and restraining
165
their possible arbitrary tendencies.”
No one would argue that a court is free to ignore a binding
166
precedent simply because the parties fail to cite it. Likewise, even
when litigants agree on misstatements of law, courts must be free to
articulate the correct legal standard when deciding their cases. If stare
decisis is to serve as a meaningful constraint on judicial discretion,
neither litigants nor judges can be given the freedom to create new
legal standards, unfettered by either past precedent or existing law,
that may then mislead all those who must comply.
Indeed, it is anomalous that common law countries operate
within an adversarial system that rejects judicial issue creation while
civil law countries follow an inquisitorial model that allows for it. In a
common law system, judicial decisions have the weight of law and are
binding on all those who follow; in civil law systems, judicial decisions
are “merely evidence of the law” and therefore do not carry the same
167
legal force. Accordingly, issue creation would seem to be most
valuable in a common law system, where judges are responsible not
just for resolving a dispute but for settling a question of law for all
time, and thus where incomplete or inaccurate litigant articulations of
the law are all the more problematic. Part III contends that the
solution to this anomaly is to adopt a more flexible conception of
adversarialism that makes room for judicial issue creation without
abandoning the dialectical exchange at the core of the adversary
process.
III. ISSUE CREATION AND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
In the typical case, the federal judiciary’s law-pronouncement
function is perfectly compatible with adversarial theory. Under an
adversarial system as usually defined, the parties frame and argue the
case before a passive judge, who then decides the dispute on the
168
parties’ preferred terms. When the parties are well matched, and
when they both have an interest in presenting all the arguments in
favor of their position, adversary process will produce the best
165. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 20–21 (1975).
166. See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 511–12 (1994) (holding that an appellate
court should take notice of legal precedent overlooked by the parties).
167. See supra note 24.
168. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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possible judicial decision to guide society about the meaning of law.
The system breaks down, however, when the parties have either
intentionally or accidentally overlooked a legal argument relevant to
the dispute, forcing judges to choose between resolving the dispute on
the parties’ terms or issuing an inaccurate statement of law. In this
Part, this Article contends that these two functions can be reconciled
by adopting a more flexible conception of adversary process that
permits judges to step in to augment party presentations while
maintaining the opportunity for an adversarial exchange on the new
issues they raise.
A. Incorporating Issue Creation into Adversary Theory
Party presentation of the facts and legal arguments in a dispute is
a central tenet of the adversarial system of justice, and the adversarial
system itself is widely acknowledged to be a fundamental feature of
169
the American adjudicatory process. Accordingly, judicial power to
raise new legal claims and theories, and then to decide cases on
grounds that the parties did not identify and perhaps do not wish to
assert, is seemingly at odds with the judicial role in the American
legal system. The many exceptions to the party presentation norm
discussed in Part I.B thus seem incompatible with the prevailing
model of adjudication in the United States.
But perhaps the problem is with adversary theory itself, at least
in its purest form. First, it appears best suited to a judicial system that
is focused on dispute resolution, and seems less relevant for a legal
system in which the judiciary is also charged with issuing accurate
pronouncements about the meaning of law that bind future litigants.
Second, even as a method of dispute resolution, adversary theory falls
short if the parties are mismatched, or if both simply fail to grasp the
essential legal and factual questions at the heart of their case. These
defects have been widely noted before, and perhaps for that reason
the U.S. legal system has never been perfectly adversarial (as this
170
Article demonstrates). Nonetheless, the adversary system as an
171
ideal type has a strong hold on jurists’ conceptions of their role.

169. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 20
(1984).
170. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 1, at 824 (describing flaws in the adversarial system); id.
at 843 (discussing the problem of “poor quality of legal representation”); William B.
Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1867–68
(2002) (noting that the adversary system breaks down when the parties are not evenly matched);
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The contrasting theories of Lon Fuller, Abram Chayes, and
Owen Fiss illustrate the tension between dispute resolution and law
pronouncement, and may also provide the key to resolving that
tension. Professor Fuller is closely associated with the dispute
resolution model of adjudication, defined as one in which two private
parties resolve their disputes through an adversarial presentation to
an impartial and passive decisionmaker. Professors Chayes and Fiss
172
critiqued this traditional account of adjudication. They argued that
modern adjudication was (and should be) primarily focused on
articulating norms that extended far beyond the parties. Chayes noted
that under the “traditional” model described by Fuller, adjudication is
“a vehicle for settling disputes between private parties about private
rights,” which he contrasted with the “public law” model in which
“the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or
173
statutory policies.” Likewise, Fiss asserted that while “dispute
resolution may be one consequence of” adjudication, he argued that
the “function of the judge . . . is not to resolve disputes, but to give the
174
proper meaning to our public values.”
Consistent with their conception of adjudication as an
opportunity for law pronouncement affecting many, Professors
Chayes and Fiss both asserted the need for a more proactive judicial
role in the framing of litigation. Chayes argued that in the public law
litigation model, the judge has “responsibility . . . for organizing and
175
shaping litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome.” Fiss noted
how easily a court could “be led into error” by the parties, who
“wittingly or unwittingly” could compromise the interests of others,
and he concluded that it is “almost absurd [for a court] to rely
exclusively on the initiatives of those persons or agencies who
Sward, supra note 42, at 312 (stating that “the parties may be quite unequal in resources or
skill” and that “[a]dversary theory tends to ignore this inequality”).
171. Sklansky, supra note 48, at 4 (noting that the vast majority of American judges believes
that the inquisitorial role played by judges in civil law systems should be avoided).
172. See Fiss, supra note 22, at 39 (“The most sustained effort to build a case for dispute
resolution on the basis of moral axioms is Lon Fuller’s essay, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication.”).
173. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1282–84.
174. Fiss, supra note 22, at 30; see also id. at 29 (“I doubt whether dispute resolution is an
adequate description of the social function of courts. To my mind courts exist to give meaning to
our public values . . . .”); Fiss, supra note 28, at 1085 (stating that the “job” of a judge “is not to
maximize the ends of private parties . . . but to explicate and give force to the values embodied
in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes”).
175. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1302; see also id. at 1298 (describing the judge’s “active role in
shaping, organizing and facilitating the litigation”).
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happened to be named plaintiff and defendant.” Although neither
scholar challenged the party presentation rule specifically, both
sought to transform the judge from passive recipient of the parties’
arguments to proactive participant in the framing of litigation.
At first glance, there appears to be an unbridgeable gap between
Professor Fuller’s dispute resolution model of adjudication, which
corresponds with an adversarial system of party presentation, and
Professors Fiss and Chayes’s public law model, which requires a more
active, and thus inquisitorial-like, judicial role. This gap is mirrored in
the disjunction between law pronouncement and dispute resolution.
But perhaps there is a middle ground that allows law pronouncement
and dispute resolution to occur in the same process, and to do so
without sacrificing the goals of the adversarial system. Indeed, upon
closer inspection, Fiss’s, Chayes’s, and Fuller’s conceptions all allow
for procedures that integrate dispute resolution and law
pronouncement, belying the sometimes monochromatic portrayal of
177
their respective views.
An examination of these scholars’
approaches to the problem provides some guidance on how courts
might integrate the dispute resolution and law pronouncement
functions.
To start, Professor Fuller’s view of adjudication left room for
178
more active judicial participation than is commonly assumed. Fuller
understood the adversarial system as intent “on keeping distinct the
function of the advocate, on the one hand, from that of the
179
judge . . . on the other,” which allowed for the possibility that the
judge could introduce new arguments into the adjudication as long as
he did not give up his judicial role for that of advocate. Although
Fuller asserted that the system works best when the decisionmaker
“rests his decision wholly on the proofs and argument actually
presented to him by the parties,” he acknowledged that “[i]n
180
practice . . . it is not always possible to realize this ideal.” Fuller

176. Fiss, supra note 22, at 25–26.
177. Cf. Molot, supra note 28 (describing how the traditional forms of adjudication
described by Fuller provided useful guides to judges overseeing class actions and other types of
modern, “public law” adjudication).
178. Id. at 35 n.17; see also Bone, supra note 22, at 1275 (arguing that Fuller’s work has been
misconstrued, and claiming that in fact “Fuller’s theory lies somewhere between the public law
and dispute resolution poles”).
179. LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 1 (quoting Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in
TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 34–35 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961)).
180. Fuller, supra note 19, at 388.
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noted that judges could raise new arguments without abandoning
party participation or judicial neutrality by seeking reargument or
181
issuing a tentative decree. In other words, Fuller himself recognized
that judges can raise legal issues without transforming themselves into
advocates.
Likewise, Professors Chayes and Fiss’s divergence from the
traditional forms of adjudication described by Professor Fuller has
been overstated. Chayes and Fiss asserted that judges should take a
more active role in framing cases, but sought to find ways for judges
to do so without jeopardizing their neutrality. Fiss observed that it
would be “foolish for the judge to assume a representational role
himself,” which could sacrifice judicial impartiality, and thus he
suggested that the judge should instead expand opportunities for
interested persons representing diverse viewpoints to participate in
182
cases to which they are not parties. Similarly, Chayes did not expect
the judge to both raise and argue new legal issues, noting that a judge
can “appoint guardians ad litem for unrepresented interests” and
should “employ experts and amici to inform himself on aspects of the
183
case not adequately developed by the parties.” Thus, Chayes and
Fiss’s conceptions of adjudication maintained the distinct roles for
advocates and judges defended by Fuller even while promoting
184
judicial power to reframe litigant disputes.

181. Id. at 389.
182. Fiss, supra note 22, at 26.
183. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1312.
184. Although the standard definition of the adversarial system is one in which opposing
parties present facts and legal arguments to a mostly passive and entirely impartial
decisionmaker, a few scholars have taken a broader view. Professor John Langbein considered
the core characteristic of an adversarial system to be advancement of partisan positions through
a dialectical exchange, but he rejected an understanding of the adversarial system that left
judges sitting passively on the sidelines. In his article promoting the West German dispute
resolution system, Langbein argued that United States judges could become more involved in
factual investigation without eliminating adversarialness from the system. As Langbein
described it, even systems traditionally understood as inquisitorial, such as that existing in West
Germany in the 1980s, have many adversarial components. Indeed, Langbein argued that the
West German system is an adversarial system. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 824. West German
judges take the lead in factual investigations, but they give the parties opportunities to suggest
lines of inquiry and sources of evidence, to supplement judicial questioning of witnesses, and to
argue inferences from the facts elicited. Although Langbein acknowledged that the traditional
view of an adversarial legal system was one in which the parties, and not the judge, were
charged with factfinding, he nonetheless argued that the essential adversarial character could be
maintained even if judges were given the lead role in factual investigation. Id. at 824–25. This
Article does not take a position on this question, but makes a more modest suggestion along the
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Accordingly, all three scholars seem to acknowledge that the
American adversarial system has enough play in the joints to allow
judges (as well as third parties, such as amici) to raise arguments
overlooked by the parties without compromising the essentially
partisan nature of dispute resolution in the United States. The next
Section explores how judicial issue creation, carefully managed, can
be faithful to the goals of adversarial theory.
B. Issue Creation and the Goals of the Adversarial System
Judicial issue creation is consistent with the rationales cited in
185
support of the adversarial system, discussed in detail in Part I. Issue
creation can enhance truth seeking without sacrificing a judge’s
impartiality or undermining litigant autonomy. Indeed, permitting a
judge to introduce legal issues might answer, at least in small part, the
most persistent criticism of adversarial procedure—that it fails when
the parties’ skills and resources are not evenly matched. The pages
that follow seek to justify issue creation on adversary theory’s own
terms by demonstrating that the adversarial nature of dispute
resolution can be maintained, along with the benefits that are claimed
to arise from it, even when judges play a role in developing legal
arguments.
1. Enhancing Truth Seeking. The adversarial system has been
touted as the best method of determining the truth of the matter in
186
dispute, and thus of reaching the right result in each case. The basic
characteristics of adversary procedure—such as notice, a hearing, and
an opportunity to present evidence and test an opponent’s evidence—

same lines. Judges may identify legal arguments overlooked by the parties without violating the
central tenets of adversary theory.
185. As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that the claimed benefits of the adversarial
system discussed below are themselves disputed, particularly of late, when adversary process has
come under sustained attack. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 28, at 31 (noting that “the traditional
adversarial process has come to be viewed with considerable skepticism” (citing Carrie MenkelMeadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 5, 12–24 (1996))). I do not seek to prove that these benefits in fact accompany
adversarial procedures—that is a separate debate that has been the subject of numerous other
articles. Rather, this Part argues that sua sponte decisionmaking is compatible with adversarial
theory in that it promotes many of the same goals.
186. Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57,
73 (1998) (“[T]he adversary system is the method of dispute resolution that is most effective in
determining truth . . . .”).

FROST IN FINAL

500

11/12/2009 10:58:50 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:447
187

are lauded as essential to reaching the correct outcome. As the
Supreme Court declared: “[O]ur legal tradition regards the adversary
process as the best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the
188
risk of error.”
And yet to achieve this goal, there must be at least a rough
equality in the resources and presentation skills of the advocates for
either party—what Professor Frank Michelman, among others, refers
to as “equipage equality”—that all too often does not exist. As one
legal scholar observed,
[o]ur adversary system is premised upon the idea that the most
accurate and acceptable outcomes are produced by a real battle
between equally-armed contestants; thus the adversary system
requires, if it is to achieve these goals, some measure of equality in
189
the litigants’ capacities to produce their proofs and arguments.

Without equipage equality, “the stronger case might not necessarily
190
be the better case.” When the resources and abilities of opposing
parties are lopsided, the adversarial system will fail to produce
accurate results. The wealthier, sophisticated, repeat-player litigants
will usually win; the poorer, outgunned, one-shot litigants will lose,
191
regardless of the merit of their cases. Indeed, critics cite this
problem as one of the adversarial system’s major flaws, and note that
the other claimed benefits of adversarial presentation—the dignity
and participation values, for example—are small compensation for
192
the inevitable losses suffered by the weaker party.
As one
prominent critic of the adversarial system commented: “The simple
truth is that very little in our adversary system is designed to match

187. This view is under significant strain today, however. Even vigorous proponents of the
adversary system are willing to concede that the ascertainment of truth is not its forte. See
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 505
(1986) (commenting that John Wigmore’s description of cross-examination as the “greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth” is likely to generate “chuckles”).
188. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (“[O]ur adversary system presupposes [that] accurate and just results are
most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests . . . .”).
189. Rubenstein, supra note 170, at 1867–68.
190. Id. at 1873–74.
191. Stephan Landsman, a strong proponent of the adversarial system, nonetheless
acknowledged that “[i]f the lawyers fail to carry out their duty, development of the case will be
impeded, and the adversary process may be undermined.” LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 4.
192. Sward, supra note 42, at 312 (observing that “the parties may be quite unequal in
resources or skill” and that “[a]dversary theory tends to ignore this inequality”).
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combatants of comparable prowess, even though adversarial prowess
193
is a main factor affecting the outcome of litigation.”
By raising overlooked issues and legal authority, a judge can
ameliorate the imbalances that undermine the adversarial system. For
that very reason, judges have a tradition of assisting pro se litigants
with case presentation. The same rationale that permits judges to
depart from the party presentation rule in pro se cases should apply in
cases in which one lawyer is clearly outgunned. This exception to the
principle of party presentation should be viewed not as a deviation
from adversary theory, but rather as a means of promoting
adversarialism by ensuring that it works as best it can. The judge can
make the adversary system more efficient at reaching just and
accurate outcomes by helping to right the imbalance in opposing
lawyers’ skills and resources.
Allowing judges to raise issues is not equivalent to transforming
the judge into an advocate for one side or the other. An advocate
finds facts and legal precedents that help only the one party he has
been charged to represent, and then uses them to make arguments on
that party’s behalf. But judges need not go so far to correct an
imbalance in the system. If a judge realizes that there is an important
legal argument that has been overlooked, or valuable precedent that
has gone uncited, the judge does not act as advocate if she points out
the missing information and provides both parties with an
opportunity to address the issues she has identified. If neither party
chooses to do so, the court can obtain guidance from an amicus
assigned to make the relevant arguments. In short, the line between
judge and advocate can be firmly maintained even when a judge takes
on a more active role in framing the case.
2. Maintaining the Impartial Decisionmaker. By requiring that
judges remain passive and reactive, adversarial process supposedly
protects judges from forming prejudgments and developing biases
194
that are claimed to be a drawback of the inquisitorial system.
Professor Fuller concluded that “in the absence of an adversary
presentation, there is a strong tendency by any deciding official to
reach a conclusion at an early stage and to adhere to that conclusion

193. Langbein, supra note 1, at 843.
194. Resnik, supra note 39, at 383 n.41 (noting that the adversarial system “emphasize[s]
judges’ disengagement as the means of achieving impartiality”).
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in the face of conflicting considerations later developed.” Fuller
noted that a committee of the American Bar Association (which he
chaired) had recently reached the same conclusion: “An adversary
presentation seems the only effective means for combating this
natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar
196
that which is not yet fully known.”
The fear is that judges will be unable to remain impartial when
deciding legal questions that they themselves have inserted into the
litigation. Furthermore, the appearance of justice might suffer
because the litigants and the general public might conclude that the
judge is now a partisan player in the litigation rather than a detached
197
observer to the dispute. Erwin Chemerinsky made this very point
when criticizing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Dickerson. He argued
that the Fourth Circuit invoked the federal statute over the parties’
objections “precisely because it wanted to reach a particular result:
198
upholding its constitutionality,” and he concluded that courts should
199
not raise issues sua sponte to avoid the appearance of bias.
The concern is a serious one, and thus worth closer scrutiny. If a
judge were to advocate for one of the parties by investigating facts
and researching legal arguments to assist only that party, the judge
would be tainted. But there is no reason to think that a judge who
notes an overlooked issue and asks the parties to investigate and brief
it will review that issue any differently than a question raised by the
parties themselves. Indeed, if simply raising a legal issue sua sponte
were enough to jeopardize judicial impartiality, then presumably due
process would require that judges never do so. Yet judges regularly
raise on their own motion threshold procedural questions, such as
200
subject matter jurisdiction and res judicata. Indeed, judges are
required to ascertain their own jurisdiction before hearing a case—an
195. Fuller, supra note 179, at 43; see also LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 37 (“If the judge is
assigned the task of making factual inquiry, both theoretical analysis and empirical data suggest
that his biases are likely to be intensified and his decisions opened to prejudicial influence.”);
Freedman, supra note 186, at 75–80 (1998) (contrasting adversarial and inquisitorial judicial
models).
196. Fuller, supra note 179, at 44 (quoting Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958)).
197. See LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 44–45 (“Because the judge seldom takes the lead in
conducting the proceedings, he is unlikely to appear to be partisan or to become embroiled in
the contest. His detachment preserves the appearance of fairness as well as fairness itself.”).
198. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 302.
199. Id. at 291.
200. See supra Part I.B.
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issue about which judges arguably are self-interested because at least
some would prefer to clear their dockets and avoid the extra work.
Courts usually seek supplemental briefing on these questions, and
sometimes conclude that their concerns were unfounded. If judges are
capable of both raising and deciding these questions impartially, why
should they forgo raising issues that go to the very heart of the
dispute?
Moreover, judges are forced into far more conflicted positions on
a regular basis. Appellate courts routinely require district court
judges to reconsider recently issued judgments, reduce sentences they
have just handed down, vacate convictions they have just presided
over, or apply a new legal standard after being reversed. Trial judges
for the most part faithfully follow appellate court mandates even
when they must repudiate their own view of the law and apply a new
201
standard of the appellate court’s choosing. As Professor Chayes
observed, judges are “governed by a professional ideal of reflective
and dispassionate analysis of the problem before [them],” which
202
enables them to apply law with which they disagree. Distrust of
judicial power to reframe legal questions impartially is at odds with a
system that makes such demands on its judges.
To be sure, judges should be careful to avoid putting themselves
into the shoes of an advocate. As Professors Fiss and Chayes both
argued, judges should not take on the task of representing any party’s
interest, but rather should seek out amici, experts, and guardians ad
litem to do so for them when the parties themselves are unable or
203
unwilling to brief and argue a point of law the judge thinks relevant.
But with these safeguards in place, judges are perfectly capable of
204
resolving legal questions they raise in the first instance without bias.

201. Resnik, supra note 39, at 428 (“Many current practices assume that trial judges can
compartmentalize their minds, disregard inappropriate evidence, and reconsider past decisions
in light of new information.”).
202. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1308.
203. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
204. Unfortunately, the judiciary’s reputation for impartiality has suffered under the status
quo, in which courts make ad hoc exceptions to the norm of party presentation without
articulating a rationale for doing so. Judges who introduce new issues are viewed with suspicion,
especially when the issue they raise accords with their perceived ideological bias—such as when
the notably conservative Fourth Circuit concluded sua sponte that Miranda had been
overridden by statute. Dickerson v. United States, 166 F.3d 667, 695 (4th Cir. 1999). As one
critic of judicial issue creation observed, the “absence of a consistent principle leaves courts
open to the accusation that ignoring the adversary process is a political action, where the court
reaches out to legislate instead of following judicial norms.” Miller, supra note 68, at 1260.
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More worrisome is the possibility that judges will end up raising
arguments to favor the party that they would prefer to win the case. If
judges felt free to raise new legal issues, they might look for legal
arguments that benefit one category of litigant or interest over
another. But this concern is really about judicial bias generally. If a
judge is not truly impartial, she will likely interpret the facts and law
to the benefit of one party and the detriment of the other, regardless
of whether she raises a new issue sua sponte. In other words, issue
creation may reflect bias, but is not likely to lead to bias. In fact,
permitting issue creation might improve matters. If the parties are
given an opportunity to respond to any new issue raised by the judge,
as adversarial theory requires, they can counter any subconscious
judicial bias by describing the flaws in the judge’s legal analysis.
Indeed, if the judge is inhibited from raising an overlooked legal
argument, the issue of law he identified might influence him more
than if it is fully ventilated and found to be irrelevant to the case
before him.
3. Preserving Litigant Autonomy.
A noninstrumentalist
argument in favor of the adversarial system is that parties are more
satisfied with the decisionmaker’s result when they are given an
205
opportunity to be heard on their own terms. Party control “focuses
the litigation upon the questions of greatest importance to the parties,
making more likely a decision tailored to their needs,” whereas a
“judge-dominated procedure increases the likelihood that the needs
206
of the litigants will not be fully appreciated or satisfied.” Giving
litigants control over case presentation is thus claimed to lead to more
accurate and better-received decisions than a judge-dominated
system of dispute resolution.
Furthermore, legal commentators observe that party
presentation is well suited to the American national character. As
Professor Landsman describes it, party presentation ensures that the
dispute resolution process will center on the interests of the individual
“rather than those of his attorney, of the court, or of society at
207
large.” Proponents claim that the opportunity for individuals to be
heard—to have their day in court—promotes respect for human
205. LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 44 (“Adversary theory holds that if a party is intimately
involved in the adjudicatory process and feels that he has been given a fair opportunity to
present his case, he is likely to accept the results whether favorable or not.”).
206. Id. at 4.
207. Id. at 46.
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dignity and places a human face on abstract disputes. The United
States is a highly individualistic society that values personal choice
209
and expression above membership in groups. Generally speaking,
most Americans place a greater value on individual freedom and
express a greater distrust of centralized governmental authority than
210
most Europeans. Accordingly, Americans prefer a system that gives
private parties, rather than governmental actors such as judges,
control over the presentation of evidence and the framing of
litigation.
Judicial issue creation need not undermine litigant autonomy,
however. Litigants are still able to frame the case as they see best, and
the court must still read and respond to their legal arguments.
Although a judge may ask the litigants to provide supplemental briefs
on issues the judge raised sua sponte, a party is always free to respond
that it does not believe the argument raised by the court is one on
which it should prevail. In Dickerson, for instance, the government
informed the Fourth Circuit that it believed 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was
unconstitutional, and thus refused to rely on that statute as a basis for
211
admitting Dickerson’s confession. Although courts have the last
word on the meaning of the law, they have no power to force any
litigant, including the executive branch, to defend a statute it has

208. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 67–103 (1988);
Sward, supra note 42, at 317 (noting that as the adversary system’s ability to locate truth has
come under attack, its supporters have cited its ability to promote human dignity as its primary
rationale); see also LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 37 (stating that party control of litigation
results in more complete information).
209. See LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 24 (“The element of party control of proceedings
apparent in English procedure from the earliest times was also attractive to the intensely
individualist polity of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The English and American
judicial process made increasing allowances for each party to run his lawsuit as he saw fit, to
voice his claims and to select his evidence. The judicial decision was directly tied to the
presentations of the parties. It is not surprising that these facets of procedure were accentuated
in an age preoccupied with the establishment of individual political and economic rights.”).
210. Langbein, supra note 1, at 855 (“Americans will long remain uncomfortable at the
prospect of a more bureaucratic judiciary. . . . Some observers point to that elusive construct,
national character. Europeans in general and Germans in particular are thought to be more
respectful of authority, hence better disposed toward the more bureaucratic mode of justice that
judicialized fact-gathering entails.”).
211. Dickerson v. United States, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1999). Likewise, in Pearson v.
Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008), the Court asked the parties to address whether its precedent in
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), should be overruled, but neither party was compelled to
argue that precedent should fall (and, in fact, both claimed that it should be upheld in modified
form). Pearson, 128 S. Ct. at 1702–03; see infra text accompanying notes 228–29.
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concluded is unconstitutional, or which it believes does not apply to
212
the case at hand.
Courts have readily available alternatives in those rare cases in
which litigants refuse to defend the constitutionality of a statute—
they can assign an amicus to argue in favor of the statute. Indeed, in
Dickerson, Paul Cassell had already submitted an amicus brief in
defense of the statute, and the Fourth Circuit granted him argument
time as well. He ably played the same role in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Turning to an amicus is a perfectly acceptable solution to a
breakdown in the adversarial process, as it maintains the dialectical,
partisan exchange essential to adversarial theory. In short, a litigant’s
power to control the case he presents to the court remains unchanged
even in a system in which judges are encouraged to raise issues sua
sponte.
4. Protecting Institutional Competence. Adversary process is
praised for its compatibility with judges’ core institutional
competences. Judges are well suited to resolving disputes initiated by
the parties, but lack the institutional capacity to frame cases
themselves. Judges do not have the staff or funds to personally
investigate the facts of the cases that come before them, nor do they
share the parties’ incentives to uncover all the information that could
213
assist them in making their case. Judges are politically insulated and
unaccountable, making them especially inept at identifying the
214
pressing social problems most in need of resolution. In contrast,
212. The Fourth Circuit was highly critical of the government, claiming that the Department
of Justice had “elevat[ed] politics over law.” Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672. Although I defend the
Fourth Circuit’s discretion to raise the statute sua sponte, I believe that the court erred in
criticizing the executive branch for refusing to argue that § 3501 displaced Miranda. I agree with
Professor Chemerinsky, who argued that the “Fourth Circuit falsely attributed a political motive
to the Justice Department to pave the way for it to consider § 3501 sua sponte.” Chemerinsky,
supra note 19, at 290. As Chemerinsky noted, “[t]here is no imaginable political benefit to the
incumbent administration from not using § 3501.” Id.
213. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 n.10 (1974) (“[The
judicial process] is in sharp contrast to the political processes in which the Congress can initiate
inquiry and action, define issues and objectives, and exercise virtually unlimited power by way
of hearings and reports, thus making a record for plenary consideration and solutions. The
legislative function is inherently general rather than particular and is not intended to be
responsive to adversaries asserting specific claims or interests peculiar to themselves.”); Miller,
supra note 30, at 1050 (“[S]ua sponte consideration of issues is an inefficient use of judicial
resources. . . . [R]elying on litigants to present arguments in cases [enables courts to] focus their
energies on evaluating these arguments.”).
214. Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (1968) (“The court, not being a
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private litigants will bring those cases most important to them, and
are well situated, and highly motivated, to unearth the facts and
215
sources of law that will support their case.
These institutional competence arguments are good reason to
assign fact investigation and agenda setting to the litigants rather than
to the judge, but they do not support the conclusion that judges
should similarly play no role in identifying overlooked legal issues. To
the contrary, federal judges are ideally suited to raise overlooked
legal issues sua sponte. Most federal judges practiced law for several
decades before taking the bench, and many were selected for a
federal judgeship precisely because they were unusually successful
216
lawyers. Federal judges are conditioned to think about the case as
an advocate, and thus to formulate the best legal arguments for each
217
side. A rigid rule of party presentation squanders this trove of
judicial expertise by muzzling the best lawyer in the room.
To be sure, judges do not have the time or resources to
investigate new lines of argument in each case before them, and this
Article does not advocate that judges go so far. The point here is only
that when judges do stumble upon a new legal claim, source of law, or
line of reasoning, they should not be discouraged from noting that
issue and asking the parties to address it.
Writing for a Seventh Circuit panel that refused to raise an
overlooked (and winning) issue for a party whose lawyer dropped the
ball, Judge Posner argued that “we cannot have a rule that in a
sympathetic case an appellant can serve us up a muddle in the hope

representative institution, not having initiating powers and not having a staff for the gathering
of information, must rely on the parties and their advocates to frame the problem and to present
the opposing considerations relevant to its solution.”).
215. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 40 (“Because federal courts have limited ability to
conduct independent investigations, they must depend on the parties to fully present all relevant
information to them. It is thought that adverse parties, with a stake in the outcome of the
litigation, will perform this task best.”); see also Molot, supra note 28, at 59–63 (arguing that
judges are institutionally suited to rely on parties to frame issues).
216. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 34 (2d ed. 1985)
(“[Judges] have successful careers either in private practice or in government . . . . They are
appointed or elected to judicial positions on the basis of a variety of factors, including success in
practice, their reputation among their fellow lawyers, and political influence.”); Resnik, supra
note 39, at 426 (“Many [judges] have been trial lawyers . . . .”).
217. But see Resnik, supra note 39, at 426 (“[J]udges may well overestimate the extent of
their wisdom. Many have been trial lawyers; they have some appreciation for which litigant
tactics are well founded and which are dilatory. But because few have practiced in all of the
diverse areas of federal court jurisdiction, they may reach ill-founded conclusions in cases about
which they really know very little.”).
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that we or our law clerks will find somewhere in it a reversible
218
error.” But it is hard to see why not. Federal judges are public
servants, appointed by elected officials and paid in taxpayers’ dollars.
If the lawyers have failed to perform their function effectively, and
the wise and experienced judge is aware of important legal arguments
overlooked by one or the other, there is no reason for the judge to
turn a blind eye to the winning arguments he identified. Although
Judge Posner feared that judicial issue creation might diminish
219
lawyers’ incentives to locate all of the best arguments, that concern
seems farfetched. No one contends that judges should affirmatively
search out the best arguments for one side or the other—as discussed,
judges lack the time and resources for such a task. Rather, the claim is
only that if judges do see an argument missed by the parties, they
should be free to raise it on the condition that it is closely related to
the legal question before them, and the parties are given a chance to
220
voice their views on the issue. Accordingly, no reasonable lawyer
would slack off on the assumption that the judge would catch
whatever issues she missed.
Judge Posner seems to view his role entirely as a dispute resolver
in the adversarial tradition, rather than also as a law pronouncer in
the common law tradition. Perhaps the harsh results of his rule of
judicial passivity are justified in a system in which the only parties
that suffer are those who failed to put forward the strongest case in
their favor. But in the United States federal courts, where decisions
by appellate judges bind all in that jurisdiction, and all judicial
decisions are intended to serve as accurate statements about the
meaning of law to guide others, a poorly reasoned legal decision
221
harms many more than just the party before the court.
IV. ISSUE CREATION IN PRACTICE
Part II of this Article discussed the arguments in favor of issue
creation—arguments that have been missing from the discussion thus
far or that have been drowned out by the rhetoric of adversarialism.
Part III described how the values of adversarialism could be
218. Hartmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 9 F.3d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1993).
219. See id.
220. See infra Part IV for further discussion of when and how courts should engage in issue
creation.
221. See supra notes 175–76 (discussing Chayes’s and Fiss’s arguments in support of judicial
issue creation).
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preserved even in a system in which courts raised arguments
overlooked or ignored by the parties. This Part takes these rationales
for issue creation and attempts to make practical use of them by
developing a typology of cases in which issue creation is appropriate,
and describing the circumstances under which it is not. Drawing these
lines is not easy, and I do not claim to provide a definitive set of
criteria for when such determinations may be made. Nonetheless, I
hope this Part will provide some guidance by translating the
rationales for issue creation into a more concrete set of factors
governing the exercise of judicial discretion to raise new issues.
A. Factors Favoring Issue Creation
Certain case-specific factors favor the use of issue creation.
Courts should raise new issues when failing to do so would result in
erroneous statements of precedent-setting law. They should also
supplement the parties’ arguments when necessary to maintain
control over interpretative methods. Finally, courts may need to
engage in issue creation to give voice to legislative enactments
disfavored or ignored by the parties, especially when no other litigant
can vindicate those rights.
1. Protecting Law Pronouncement. As discussed in Part II.A.1,
the rationale for issue creation is at its most powerful when the
parties, either intentionally or by mistake, misrepresent the law and
ask the court to decide the case on those grounds. Indeed, the very
reason to give Article III judges life tenure and salary guarantees is to
ensure that they determine the meaning of law free from outside
influence. Accordingly, courts should not sacrifice that independence
by deciding cases on the parties’ terms. Furthermore, judicial
opinions set precedent that either binds the lower courts or serves as
a guide for judges addressing the question in the future. Thus, courts
must on occasion eschew the party presentation rule to avoid issuing
decisions containing erroneous statements of law.
In contrast, a court has no reason to raise issues that are
tangential to or distinct from the claims that the parties have asked
the court to decide, because in these cases its opinion will not mislead
others or create flawed precedent. For example, even if a party could
have challenged a federal statute on commerce clause grounds—as
Justice Thomas suggested might be grounds for striking down the
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partial birth abortion legislation at issue in Gonzales v. Carhart —
the Court did not need to raise this issue sua sponte because its
opinion did not risk establishing an erroneous rule of law or
misleading precedent on that question. Moreover, questions that are
truly independent from those that the parties have already briefed
and argued would likely require the development of facts not already
in the record, which is unfair to litigants who are beyond the
discovery stage—thus providing good reason for courts to ignore
those issues as well.
2. Controlling Interpretive Methods. As explained in detail in
Part II.A.2, issue creation is also justified in cases in which the parties
seek a decision on grounds that undermine judicial control over its
interpretive methods. Choosing an interpretive method is an essential
component of judging that cannot be ceded to the parties.
Furthermore, many interpretive practices are closely related to
prudential limits on judicial power. For example, courts have adopted
various canons of interpretation to avoid conflict with the other
branches of government, such as the constitutional avoidance
doctrine and the presumption against preemption of state law. Thus,
courts have good reasons to raise new arguments and legal sources
when necessary to maintain these constraints on judicial
223
decisionmaking.
3. Preserving the Integrity of Legislative Enactments. Courts are
also justified in engaging in issue creation if they believe that the
parties’ positions ignore or undermine the integrity of legislative
224
enactments. In such cases, the parties have essentially asked the
court to disregard the law and decide the case on their terms. The
problem is of particular concern when the executive branch has
adopted a policy of refusing to assert a statutory standard that no
other party would have reason to raise. Oftentimes the “case or
controversy” limitation on judicial power will prevent a court from
addressing a party’s refusal to rely on a statutorily created standard or
right, and thus the problem can be resolved only by the political
branches. But when the parties fail to raise a statute that is relevant to
222. See supra note 117.
223. See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457 (1960) (applying the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance to decide the case on statutory grounds, rather than on the
constitutional questions raised by the petitioner); supra text accompanying notes 113–29.
224. See supra Part II.C.
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the resolution of their dispute, there is no constitutional prohibition
against a court taking notice of the overlooked statute and raising it
225
sua sponte.
***
In any of the situations described above, courts raising new issues
must be careful to preserve the benefits of the adversarial structure.
As discussed in Part III, in keeping with the principles of the
adversarial system, the parties should be given notice and an
opportunity to respond. If the parties do not wish to address the issue,
stakeholders should be allowed to intervene, or amici invited to
participate, so that they can serve this purpose. Using these methods,
courts can protect the judicial function without sacrificing the benefits
of an adversarial exchange on the new issue.
B. Issue Creation and the Judicial Hierarchy
The need for issue creation may also vary with the tier of court
asked to decide the matter. Issue creation comes with a slightly
different set of costs and benefits at each level of the federal court
system, and thus the place of the court in the judicial hierarchy should
be factored into a court’s decision of whether to raise an issue sua
sponte.
1. District Courts.
District courts do not set precedent,
suggesting that issue creation is less vital at this lowest level of the
federal court system. District court decisions receive significantly less
press and popular attention than those of higher level courts, and thus
are less likely to mislead the public about the meaning of the law.
Even so, district courts have an obligation to state the law accurately.
Every Article III court plays the dual role of deciding cases while
declaring the meaning of law. The district court’s statements about

225. Dickerson is an example of just such a case. The executive refused to raise 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501, relying instead on the stricter standard for admission of confessions provided in
Miranda, and yet Congress had intended that statutory standard to displace Miranda. No
criminal defendant would argue that the statute set the relevant standard for admission of
confessions, of course, because it purported to establish a more lenient rule for admitting
confessions. Without a court’s intervention, the statute would lie dormant. Thus, issue creation
was appropriate in Dickerson to protect Congress’s legislative role. The need for issue creation
in such cases is particularly important because otherwise the executive branch could co-opt
courts, benefitting from legal decisions by politically insulated courts that appear to sanction the
executive’s view of the law.
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the meaning of law are not limited to the individuals specifically
before it, but are intended to describe the law as it applies to all. The
fact that the district court’s decision binds only the parties at hand
makes it no less a statement of “law” than a Supreme Court opinion,
thus justifying issue creation in some cases. In addition, district courts
have the same interest as appellate courts in protecting legislative
enactments and preserving their interpretive role.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, district courts are in the best
position to raise new issues because they need not be as concerned
about finality, or the possibility of prejudice, as an appellate court
considering whether to raise a new issue sua sponte. At the pretrial
stage, the parties can explore factual questions essential to the new
legal issue, and there is far less disruption to settled expectations than
when an issue is injected by a court further down the line.
Thus, while district courts have slightly less compelling reasons
to raise new issues than appellate courts, doing so comes with fewer
costs to the litigants. Furthermore, by raising overlooked issues early
on, district court judges can avoid putting appellate courts into the
difficult position of choosing whether to insert a new legal question
into litigation at the eleventh hour.
2. Courts of Appeals. Appellate courts have yet another set of
considerations to keep in mind when deciding whether to engage in
issue creation. Circuit court decisions create precedent binding on all
future three-judge panels and district courts in that circuit, and create
persuasive precedent for judges outside the jurisdiction. Most
appellate decisions will stand as the final word on a legal question in
226
light of the rarity of either en banc or Supreme Court review. Thus,
it is exceedingly important that appellate courts get decisions right.
Furthermore, like district courts, circuit courts have no choice but to
hear and decide the cases brought before them—no matter how
inadequately presented—and thus they cannot simply avoid
addressing a poorly briefed legal question as can the United States
Supreme Court. Issue creation would thus seem most justified at the
circuit court level.

226. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Brian M. Boynton, The Court En Banc: 1991–2002, 70
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 259, 266 (2002) (“As infrequently as the D.C. Circuit heard cases en banc
[during fiscal years 1997–99], at .58% of total case dispositions it had the highest en banc
percentage of all the circuits.”).

FROST IN FINAL

2009]

11/12/2009 10:58:50 PM

LIMITS OF ADVOCACY

513

Nonetheless, there are good reasons for appellate judges to be
cautious about raising new legal questions at this late stage of the
litigation. An issue that turns on facts that are not in the record or not
fully developed would be better left unmentioned for fear of
prejudice to the parties. Moreover, any question of law that requires
development of new facts would likely be tangential to the questions
the court is asked to resolve, and thus would not qualify as a case in
which issue creation was essential to avoid erroneous statements of
227
law. Furthermore, raising new questions on appeal may delay
resolution and put litigants to additional expense. As described in
Part III, to preserve the adversarial structure, the parties must be
given time to submit supplemental briefs, or at the very least be put
on notice that they will be asked to address the new issue at oral
argument. If the parties do not take opposing positions on the
question, the panel should consider assigning an amicus to address it.
Finally, if the parties have argued the case for months or years before
a district court on one set of issues, they will likely feel ambushed by
an appellate court that injects a brand new set of legal questions into
the case. Thus, appellate courts should be aware of these costs of
issue creation and should weigh them carefully against the benefits.
3. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court seems to have the least
reason of any court to engage in issue creation because it retains
nearly complete control over its docket, and thus can avoid deciding
cases in which the parties fail to raise relevant legal questions. If the
parties fail to present the issue accurately at the certiorari stage, the
Court should simply deny certiorari and await a case in which at least
one of the parties articulates what the Court believes is the correct
legal issue. In contrast, the district and appellate courts have no
discretion to remove cases from their dockets, and thus would have
greater reason to supplement the parties’ arguments from time to
time.
Furthermore, most cases before the Supreme Court have been
litigated for years before several tribunals, and thus it is particularly
unfair to the parties to inject a new issue into litigation that has been
framed and argued consistently on different grounds. Likewise, the
factual record will have been developed to respond only to those legal
questions that were raised initially, and the Court cannot resolve a
legal issue that turns on facts not already in the record. Finally, the
227.

See supra text accompanying note 222.
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delay and disruption created by a remand to uncover new facts would
be hard on the parties, who are seeking resolution of their case. For
these reasons, the Court should have less cause than lower courts to
engage in issue creation, and should be sensitive to the hardship on
the parties were it to do so.
Nonetheless, there will be occasions on which the Supreme
Court has very good reasons to hear a case in which the parties have
failed to brief an issue. For example, the Court might conclude that
an especially important or disruptive lower court decision on
questions of pressing national importance demands immediate
Supreme Court review even when the parties are not up to the task of
adequately briefing the case. Or a party may have abandoned an
argument below, as sometimes happens when a change in the
administration leads to reversals of the executive branch’s litigating
position, and the Court may conclude that it is essential to pass on the
lower court’s resolution of the issue even though no party to the case
228
defends that ruling. In addition, the Court may need to engage in
issue creation to reverse one of its own precedents. The parties will
often hesitate to challenge a precedent directly, preferring to
distinguish it from their case, and thus the Court may be forced to
229
raise the issue on its own motion. Finally, the Justices may not be
fully cognizant of all the legal questions implicated in a case until the
Court receives the briefs on the merits, and thus only at this late stage
may the Court recognize that the parties have avoided a question that
it thinks is essential to issuing an accurate statement of law.
When these situations arise, the Supreme Court has particularly
good reasons to raise the overlooked legal question. Due to its
position atop the federal court hierarchy, it is essential that the Court
get the law right. The Court’s decisions are binding on all courts, state
and federal, and constitute high-profile statements on the meaning of

228. E.g., Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc. v. United States, 456 U.S. 922, 922 (1982) (inviting
William Coleman to brief and argue the case as an amicus after the United States abandoned
the position it had taken below); see also supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
229. In a few of the cases discussed in Part I.B, the Court overturned precedent that the
parties had not thought to question. E.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938)
(disapproving the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)); see also, e.g., Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961) (overruling an aspect of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
as that case had been interpreted up to that time). A more recent example is Pearson v.
Callahan, in which the Court granted the petition on the two questions presented and then
asked the parties to address the additional question of “[w]hether the Court’s decision in
Saucier v. Katz should be overruled.” Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702, 1702–03 (2008)
(citation omitted).
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law. Moreover, the Court’s opinions carry weight that other courts’
decisions lack. Supreme Court opinions that implicitly sanction
unconstitutional conduct by the executive or legislative branches can
mislead the nation about the limits on governmental power,
230
establishing precedent-by-practice that may be hard to undo later.
The imprimatur of a Supreme Court opinion upholding a specific
practice—and thus implying that the practice at issue is
constitutional—could establish a new legal rule even if that was far
from the Court’s intention. Furthermore, the Court would undermine
its own legitimacy if it ruled one way in a poorly briefed case, only to
quickly reverse itself in a future case in which the issue was squarely
presented. Thus, at the Supreme Court level, getting the law right is
more important than at any other.
For many of the same reasons, it is particularly important that
the Court retain control over its interpretive methods. The Court is
the standard bearer in this realm as well, and can serve as a guide to
the lower courts. Many of the Court’s interpretive choices are based
on its views regarding the appropriate judicial role—which is most
evident in the constitutional avoidance doctrine, but can also be seen
in various clear statement rules and presumptions about the meaning
of legislation. The parties should not be allowed to disrupt this
exercise of judicial discretion, forcing the Court to issue decisions that
transgress these self-imposed boundaries.
***
This Article does not contend that judges should be given the
power to set their own agenda—a role for which politically insulated
judges are ill suited. Judges should limit issue creation to situations in
which the parties’ arguments misstate the law, undermine legislative
enactments, or deprive the court of its preferred interpretive
methodology. In these circumstances, issue creation is necessary to
prevent litigants from undermining the judiciary’s role in the
constitutional structure.
The cases discussed in Part I satisfy these criteria. In Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, the question of whether the federal courts had
the authority to create federal common law was a necessary precursor

230. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 745–53 (2008)
(discussing the limited scope of judicial review of the actions of nonjudicial actors that implicate
constitutional issues).
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to the dispute over whether Tompkins should be treated as a licensee
231
or trespasser. In Washington v. Davis, the Court rejected the
parties’ interpretation of the Constitution in the course of
determining whether the defendant had violated the Equal Protection
232
Clause. In Dickerson v. United States, the Court asked whether a
statute displaced the judicially established rule for admission of
confessions, which would then affect its conclusion about whether
233
Dickerson’s confession could be admitted against him. In all three
cases, the Court reasonably concluded that its obligation to issue
accurate pronouncements of law, to protect legislative enactments,
and to preserve its preferred interpretive methodology justified
deviation from the party presentation norm.
To be sure, the Court did not handle these situations perfectly. In
both Erie and Washington, the Court did not ask the parties to brief
the question, nor did it assign an amicus to do so, depriving itself of
the benefits of an adversary presentation and the parties of a fair
hearing on the matter. Perhaps it is these violations of form, rather
than the act of issue creation, that has given issue creation its bad
name.
CONCLUSION
Despite the strong norm in favor of party presentation, in
practice judges regularly engage in judicial issue creation. Courts raise
legal arguments, claims, and sources overlooked by the parties, and
their rules permit active participation by amici. On occasion, courts
will even assign an amicus curiae to argue a position that no party to
the case supports. These practices are in tension with the rhetoric in
favor of party presentation—rhetoric grounded on the longstanding
view that judicial issue creation is antithetical to adversarial theory.
Rather than condemn these practices, this Article demonstrates
that the judicial role in the constitutional structure and common law
tradition justifies giving courts the discretion to raise new legal claims
and arguments when failure to do so would lead to inaccurate or
misleading statements of law. Federal courts are charged with the task

231. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–80 (holding that federal courts have no power to create
“federal general common law”).
232. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (reversing the lower court’s decision
on a ground not presented by the parties).
233. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (holding that Congress could
not supersede a constitutional ruling of the Supreme Court by statute).
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of expounding on the meaning of law, and they are provided with life
tenure and salary protection to ensure they do so without interference
from the other two branches or the public. In the common law
tradition, decisions by federal courts of appeals create binding
precedent that must be followed in subsequent litigation within that
jurisdiction. To preserve their role in law exposition, judges must
maintain control over case presentation when the parties fail to fully
and accurately describe the meaning of legal standards.
Moreover, and contrary to conventional wisdom, this Article has
shown that judicial issue creation is compatible with the values
underlying the adversarial tradition. Adversarialism requires that the
parties have an opportunity for a dialectical exchange on the
questions at issue in the case, allowing the judge to avoid becoming
an advocate for one party or interest, but it does not demand judicial
passivity in the face of litigants’ mischaracterization of legal
standards. As long as courts provide an opportunity for the parties to
respond to new issues (or allow amici or intervenors to do so when
the parties decline), then courts can simultaneously protect their
power to pronounce on legal questions and preserve the benefits of
the adversarial system.

